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Editor's Note
Housing and community development encompass an ever-evolving and growing range of
concerns. Local economies brace for the impact of a sweeping national recession; restruc-
turing ofwhat constitutes a "family" redefines the need for social services; and government
assistance programs emerge, change and disappear. Housing and community development
planners must stay on top ofthe insurmountable, to consider everything in the broad range
of public and private programs and then to be shrewd and flexible enough to adapt.
This edition ofCarolina Planning focuses on housing and community development issues,
an area to which we admittedly have not devoted enough coverage in the past. We have
assembled articles representing the concerns of many interest groups; however, there were
many more we would have liked to include.
In Carolina Planning's Forum section, Michael Stegman, chairman of University ofNorth
Carolina, Chapel Hill's Department ofCity and Regional Planning and consultant to HUD,
discusses the growing need for low-income housing, including the relative merits of resident
ownership in public housing projects and the keys to the success of some government
programs. Tom Schlesinger looks at the impact of the commercial banking industry on local
communities in the wake of recent mergers, and offers some recommendations for policy
makers.
Robert Schall takes us from conventional banking to economic development banking in
his review of North Carolina's Self-Help Development Bank in the In The Works section.
Sharon Levy and David Spence, UNC interns with the Durham Housing Improvement
Corporation, discuss the "circus" created by the Resolution Trust Corporation's first North
Carolina auction.
We also learn to look at housing and community development planning from three
entirely different perspectives. Paul Ketcham and Scott Siegel of the 1000 Friends of
Oregon examine the success of promoting affordable housing through land use planning in
Portland. UNC graduate Julie Locascio provides an in-depth account of the political
turmoil and the unique problems of planning for a growing refugee population in Central
America. And UNC professor William Rohe discusses the new imperative for planners-
coordinating housing and social services-with a focus on Charlotte's Gateway Housing
Program.
A bit off the beaten path, we've included two additional articles dealing with environ-
mental aspects ofcommunity planning. One, by former Carolina Planning editor Paul Kron,
reviews the Wake County Planning Department's efforts to protect rural highway corridors
from strip development. The other, by Robin Corathers ofThe Hillside Trust, discusses her
organization's efforts in Cincinnati to create a comprehensive hillside protection strategy to
serve as a model program for other communities.
Finally, this issue of Carolina Planning has undergone significant layout and design
changes from past issues. Thanks to the tireless efforts of editors Margaret Stewart and
Steven Stichter we have a new look that we think is stylistically superior to previous issues.
We hope our readers think so, too.
This issue of Carolina Planning by no means exhausts the abundant supply of ideas on
housing and community development. We expect to cover more of these and related issues
in the future; therefore, we encourage readers to respond to the content and design of this
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Low Income Home Ownership:
Now More Than Ever
Michael A. Stegman
In late 1989, members of the American Society ofReal
Estate Counselors participated in a survey about the
major forces that will influence real estate over the next
two decades. 1 The respondees agreed overwhelmingly
that the economic environment of the United States
would determine the vitality of the real estate market.
Despite a soft economy, therewas substantial optimism.
Nearly half felt that interest rates would stabilize at
about 9 percent over the next 10-20years. Ofthe remain-
der, however, almost twice as many expected interest
rates to increase as expected them to fall. The more
optimistic expectations were based on a belief, shared by
nearly two-thirds of the experts, that the United States
would become more competitive in world markets dur-
ing the next twenty years, resulting in an improvement in
the U.S. balance of trade.
According to many observers, however, the globaliza-
tion of the American economy, and its transformation
away from goods production toward services and infor-
mation processing will lead to greater income inequality
during the 1990s. Job losses will continue in higher
paying, traditional goods-producing industries with low
educational requirements. Job growth will be concen-
trated in newer, more technologically-oriented sectors
with high wages and educational requirements, as well
as in the service and retail trade sectors, which have
lower pay and educational requirements.
Despite the fact that our increasingly globalized econ-
omy is creating large numbers of high-wage, highly
skilled jobs, "the dominant trend in American job crea-
tion during the 1 970s was for low-paying jobs to replace
those which formerly provided a middle-class standard
Michael A. Stegman is professor and chairman in the De-
partment ofCity and Regional Planning, and chairman of
a new interdisciplinary Ph.D. curriculum in public policy
analysis at the University ofNorth Carolina at ChapelHill.
His current research explores the social and economic
impacts oflow-income home ownership.
of living."2 This trend will continue into the 1990s. One
recent national study shows that 64 percent ofAmerican
jobs paid middle-level wages in 1979, while the share of
middle-wage jobs created during the 1980s was only 38
percent. Over half of the net increase in employment
was in poverty-level jobs.
During roughly this same period, inflation-adjusted
rents for poor households living in unsubsidized hous-
ing increased by nearly a third.3 Since 1981 all rents have
risen 16 percent faster than inflation.4 As a result, real
residential rents in the United States are higher now
than at any time during the past 20 years. This rent
inflation has exacted a heavy toll on the supply ofafford-
able housing, suggesting that homelessness will not
abate and that housing affordability problems will be-
come even more widespread and persistent.
According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies,
the number of units renting at or below $300 a month in
real terms fell by one million between 1974 and 1985. 5
Looking ahead, another 30 percent of this stock is
estimated to be physically inadequate or at risk of loss
through upward market pressures.6 Even without the
dramatic cutbacks in federally assisted housing during
the Reagan years, the affordable housing crisis would
have worsened.
Apart from the convincingargument for substantially
more federal housing assistance of all kinds, there is an
equally compelling case for more low-income home
ownership assistance. Formanyyears, the poor have not
received an equitable share of federal housing subsidies.
In just 1989 and 1990, the amount of federal tax expen-
ditures for all home owners totaled $107 billion, two-
thirds of which went to households with incomes of
$50,000 or more. This was approximately equal to the
amount of money spent directly on all low-income sub-
sidized housing programs during the 1980s. These same
tax breaks forhome owners exceeded $80 billion in fiscal
1991 alone,which is more than five times greater than all
budget outlays for assisted housing by the Department
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of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Home ownership assistance would also enable fami-
lies to gain financial equity in an asset. This could be
especially important to low-income minorities because
equity in a house represents a very large portion of the
net wealth of minority households.
7
In 1988, 54 percent
of the average home owner's net wealth was equity in a
house. Although both net wealth and home equity were
loweramong black owners, equity accounted for fully 80
percent of their net wealth. Among Hispanics, home
equity represents virtually all (98 percent) of a house-
hold's net wealth.
For a variety of reasons, including racial discrimina-
tion, minority home ownership rates are substantially
lower than those for whites. This also means that "the
lack ofhome ownership opportunities for... [minorities]
has undermined their ability to accumulate wealth."8 It
further implies that properly structured low-income
sales programs could help remedy this injustice.
Significantly, the majority ofpublic housing residents
are minorities, as were more than 90 percent of all home
buyers in HUD's recently completed national Public
HousingHome ownership Demonstration. The amount
ofequity that public housing buyers ultimately accrue in
their units will depend upon the extent to which the
initial pricing and financing of the transaction accu-
rately reflects underlying market value, the nature and
length of resale restrictions, and the prospects for price
appreciation.
As long as there is real value present to begin with, a
low-income family can realize a relatively large increase
in net wealth even in a flat market, because home
ownership is such a highly leveraged investment. Each
one percent increase in price boosts a home owner's
return to equity by ten times that amount if she has a 90
percent mortgage, and by 33 times with a 97 percent
loan. The combination of mortgage amortization and a
five-year price-appreciation rate of just 3 percent a year
for a house that was financed with a 30-year, 97 percent
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan will gen-
erate a 40 percent annual return on initial equity. In just
five years, this modest rate of market appreciation will
produce more than a four-fold increase in the home
owner's initial equity.
There is a third, and often underemphasized, argu-
ment in favor of low-income home ownership programs.
Targeting the program to higher-income occupants of
public- and other federally-subsidized rental housing
will make these units available for poorer families on the
waiting list. According to HUD, it costs around $69,000
to build a typical new public housing unit. The operating
subsidy needed to keep the rent affordable to the very
poor over the economic life of the public housing unit
would add another $10,000-$15,000 (in present value
terms) to the federal cost. A program that would open
up an existing public housing unit by helping a family
move into home ownership at a long-term federal cost of
less than $80,000 a unit is more cost-effective than
building more public housing.
The FHA Reform Bill
Although the Bush Administration's one program,
the HOPE initiative, is consistent with a home owner-
ship-oriented, low-income housing policy, recent ac-
tions to tighten FHA mortgage lending regulations are
not. Stimulated by a Price Waterhouse audit oftheFHA
insurance fund which found that losses exceeded pre-
mium income by a wide margin on FHA transactions
that took placebetween 1975 and 1985, the FHAreform
measure enacted into law as part of the 1990 National
Affordable Housing Act increased up-front cash re-
quirements on a $70,000 house by more than $1,300 (a
44 percent increase). This is the result of an additional
insurance surcharge on low down payment loans, and a
two-thirds reduction in the amount of closing costs that
can be financed.
The Administration's emphasis on restoring the FHA
Insurance Fund to fiscal solvency is not necessarily
misplaced. However, requiring unsubsidized, lower-end
FHA insured loans to cover their own losses while at the
same throwing millions of dollars at a public housing
home ownership program that is cost-driven and with-
out market-based discipline does not make a whole lot
of policy sense.
Ironically, those in the Administration who success-
fully raised the cost of FHA financing to moderate-
income families in the name of fiscal integrity are the
same officials who have already approved spending more
than $30 million (more than $65,000 a unit) on the
rehabilitation of the 464-unit Kenilworth-Parkside public
housing complex in Washington, DC. The Federal gov-
ernment has since sold the complex to a resident man-
agement council for one dollar. While preaching actuar-
ial soundness for FHA, HUD gave its blessing to a
preliminary plan to convert Kenilworth-Parkside into a
limited equity co-op. To maintain its long-term viability,
this plan would have required resident incomes to in-
crease each year at a rate substantially greater than the
national average. When the General Accounting Office
(GAO) questioned the unrealistic underwriting assump-
tions of the Kenilworth-Parkside conversion, the pro-
ject's financial consultant defended the financing plan
with the comment that "in order to prove themselves
financially capable of purchasing their apartments, a
significant number of [Kenilworth-Parkside] families
will declare the additional [unreported] income they are
already making."9
The Administration's move to tighten up FHA's first-
time home buyer programs in accordance with the Price
Waterhouse recommendations, while not doing the same
to its various public housing home ownership initia-
tives, is myopic at best. At worst, it suggests an implicit
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policy to get the federal government out of the public
housing business at any cost.
The Lessons of the Price Waterhouse Study
The Price Waterhouse study contains five findings
that are particularly relevant to low-income home
ownership. First, there is an inverse relationship be-
tween the rate ofinflation for house prices in the country
and rates of mortgage default. During the late 1970s,
when house prices appreciated at about 12 percent a
year,FHAdefault rates werevery low. Since 1980, house
prices have increased less than 3 percent per year and
default rates have surged.
Default is most likely to occur when a borrower has
negative equity in a property. This usually happens
because the value of the property has fallen below the
loan balance. While a borrower's equity is a function of
several factors, the two most important factors are the
initial loan-to-value ratio and the subsequent price
appreciation of the property. Holding appreciation rates
constant, lower down payments result in higher default
rates. In fact, borrowers with an initial down payment of
3 percent or less defaulted on their mortgages five times
more frequently than those whose down payments ex-
ceeded 25 percent. To attach numbers to these rates,
nearly 9 percent of all recent FHA loans with an initial
down payment of 3 percent or less have already failed.
This compares with a failure rate of less than 2 percent
for loans with an initial down payment of 25 percent or
more. Additionally, within the FHA portfolio, lower
valued loans also tended to have a higher rate of default.
This was especially true for houses valued under $48,000,
where the failure rate was more than 8 percent.
The Administration 's move to tighten up FHA 's
first-time home buyerprograms ...while not
doing the same to its various public housing
home ownership initiatives, is myopic at best.
The economic model that Price Waterhouse used to
predict mortgage claims demonstrated that a home buyer's
decision to default on a mortgage will be determined
largely by their perceptions of home equity and their
desire or obligation to move. When real estate markets
experience significant and sustained declines, the best fi-
nancial option is often to walk away from the property.
This choice will be made when the resale value of the
home falls far enough below the market value of the
remaining mortgage balance to outweigh the economic
and non-economic costs of default.
Finally, it is frequently argued that, especially among
lower income borrowers, default is caused by factors
beyond the home owner's control, such as illness, di-
vorce, or unemployment. According to the Price Water-
house analysts, as long as borrowers have positive eq-
uity, they are more likely to sell their homes to recover
that equity rather than default on their loans.
The Results of HUD's Public Housing Home
Ownership Demonstration
Over a 51-month period (June 1985 through August
1989), the seventeen public housing authorities partici-
pating in the demonstration sold 320 public housing
units, only a quarter ofthe more than 1300 units theyhad
planned to sell. 10 Despite HUD's demonstration rule
that units had to be sold to existing tenants, lack of
effective demand among public housing tenants re-
sulted in nearly one out of every four sales to non-
resident households on public housing waiting lists.
Housing authorities encountered a variety of prob-
lems that affected their ability to carry out their home
ownership programs at the scale and pace originally
intended (or, in some cases, to carry them out at all).
These overlapping problems, which had a particular
impact on multi-family conversions, can be roughly di-
vided into the following categories:
• Lack of effective leadership, including internal
conflict within the local public housing authority
(PHA) and/or the community over the goals of the
public housing home ownership program;
• Poor program design and/or legal constraints con-
cerning title to public housing and involuntary relo-
cation;
• Adverse local market conditions, where public hous-
ing sales had to compete with the bargain sales of
FHA foreclosed houses;
• Lack of replacement housing; and
• Inadequate tenant incomes.
Too little time has passed to determine how well the
former public housing tenants have coped with the costs
of home ownership. There is, however, some data on
short-term affordability problems. To place these num-
bers in perspective, we should keep in mind that Price
Waterhouse has found that about 9 percent of all FHA-
insured, low down payment loans originated between
1975 and 1985 have already failed. The early evidence
from the public housing home ownership demonstra-
tion indicates that failure rates will probably be in the
same range. As of the end of August, 1989, five of the
demonstration's twelve active sales programs had al-
ready reported a problem with late payments or more
serious borrower delinquencies. Within the first 18 months
of closing, between 10 and 15 percent of the buyers
indicated that they were having problems meeting their
housing costs. About 31 percent of all buyers indicated
that their mortgage payments were causing a strain on
their budgets, and 10 percent said they were already at
least one month behind on their payments.
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In one demonstration sitewith two public housing co-
ops, one ofthe co-ops had a 20 percent delinquency rate.
In the other, a third of all buyers had fallen behind in
their housing payments within the first eighteen months
of closing and had little hope of catching up.
Annual turnover in one of these co-ops was about 27
percent, while in the second it was a lower 7 percent.
Virtually all of this turnover occurred without one market
sale of a single co-op share taking place. Despite Jack
Kemp's sentiment that "owning something changes
behavior in ways that no amount of preaching middle-
class values ever could," in at least one home ownership
site, one in five low-income buyers have already walked
away from their public housing co-op as if they were
renters. This brings us back to the Price Waterhouse
finding that even where the decision to move is caused by
personal factors, default is most likely to occur when a
borrower has no home equity.
In general, the typical single-family public housing
buyer has a positive equity position in the property from
day one. The buyer's equity, which equals the difference
between the market price of the unit and the discounted
sales price, cannot be immediately realized under the
terms of the deferred payment, second mortgage that
the housing authority holds. If buyers remain in their
homes beyond the expiration of the HUD- and PHA-
imposed resale restrictions, however, they can realize
the full amount of their initial equity by selling or
refinancing their property. Ifproperty values appreciate
during their tenure, so much the better. For example, in
buying their single-family public housing units at highly
discounted prices, buyers in Baltimore received an aver-
age of $5,300 in initial locked-in equity. In Chicago they
received about $17,000.
This is not the case in multi-family home ownership
projects. In two out of the three multi-family conver-
sions that actually closed in this program, sales prices
were based largely on total rehab costs with the financ-
ing arrangements designed to enable the housing au-
thority to eventually recover its capital costs. Rather
than reflecting real equity that the buyer can eventually
realize through maintenance ofthe unit and responsible
participation in the governance of the co-op, the forgiv-
able silentsecond mortgage held by the housing author-
ity represents excess debt. It secures that portion of the
rehab cost that the tenant buyers could not afford to
amortize on a current basis. Since buyers have negative
equity in the co-op from the outset, it is not surprising
that buyers walk away from their investments because of
unforeseen changes in their personal circumstances, the
responsibility ofself-governance, or mismanagement of
the co-op.
Conclusions
In light of the findings of these two studies, low-
income housing policies must pay more attention to
expanding low-income housing opportunities. It is more
cost effective to provide opportunities for higher-in-
come public housing residents to move out of public
housing into a home of their own than it is to sell offthe
public housing inventory. Rather than simply fighting
the administration's privatization policies, more hous-
ing authorities should be actively pursuing their own
home ownership initiatives that reward successful resi-
dents. In cases of public housing home ownership
programs, families should be given a positive equity
stake in their property from the beginning. Resale re-
strictions and prohibitions against "windfall" profits
should be more lenient than those proposed by many
housing advocates.
A public housing home ownership program should
have its own source of rehabilitation capital that does
not have to be fully repaid by residents when costs exceed
market value. This source should be separate from
existing rehabilitation programs so that the urgent need
to revitalize the public housing stock will not be com-
promised by a sales program.
Providing buyers with post-sales financial assistance
is necessary to any public housing sales program. Early
experience with families who have bought units under
the public housing home ownership demonstration
suggests that even with deeply discounted prices, many
families need continuing subsidies to keep their housing
affordable. The Administration is therefore correct in
proposing to make available housing vouchers to ten-
ants who buy their public housing units.
Home ownership must be a large component of a
broad-based, revitalized national low-income housing
policy. It should not be the entire policy, however. Given
the level of housing need in the country, successful
rental programs for the very poor should not be canni-
balized by any level of government in order to fund new
home ownership initiatives.
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Protecting Our Communities from Banking
Mega-Mergers
Tom Schlesinger
The banking industry mega-mergers announced last
Julyand August are unprecedented in size. Analysts
say others will surely follow. Many of the same analysts
reassure us that huge banking combinations and indus-
try-wide consolidation are natural, inevitable, good for
banking and good for the economy. The Bush Admini-
stration asserts that encouraging big banks to get bigger
will level the financial industry's domestic playing field
and enhance the global position of U.S. banks.
Rather than leveling the playing field, this bank-
centered approach will only preserve its tilt. Underregu-
lated firms, particularly giant financial companies, will
continue playing a disruptive, lowest-common-denomi-
nator role at the fringe of the credit system. The bigger-
is-better solution won't lay a glove on the underlying
reasons the financial industry and lenders of all sizes
flocked to ill-considered speculative investments over
the past decade. The real culprits are regulatory inequal-
ity, weak supervision and decontrolled interest rates-
not "too many banks."
There is little evidence that increased size will make
U.S.-based banks more competitive in global markets-
or that such a result might yield benefits in this country.
For example, the proposed NationsBank merger will
produce the largest bank in recent U.S. history to have
virtually no international presence.
In addition to our skepticism about banking consoli-
dation, the industry mega-mergers announced this summer
raise three specific concerns: financial instability, eco-
nomic dislocation, and concentration of economic power.
Financial Instability. These deals may well destabilize
Tom Schlesinger is the director of the Southern Finance
Project in Charlotte, NC. This article is adaptedfrom Mr.
Schlesinger's testimony on September 26, 1991 before the
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Af-
fairs.
an already unstable industry, thereby increasing govern-
ment's costs for bank failures, roiling financial markets
and sapping public confidence. The performance of
these mega-merger partners and the overall track record
of large banks send ominous signals.
The primary causes of big-bank inefficiencies are not
external factors or regulation. Several large banks have
circumvented regulatory barriers to product and geo-
graphic expansion. The results often seem more impres-
sive as legal stratagems than financial ventures. Given
their experiences, many employees of big banks agree
that their firms' inefficiencies result from the very inter-
nal conditions-such as excessive bureaucracy and rigid-
ity, and perverse reward structures-that mega-mergers
will magnify.
At worst, the current crop of mega-mergers may
produce another First Republic- or Bank of New Eng-
land-like meltdown. At best, these deals probably will
produce sluggish institutions whose greatest area of
synergy is nonperforming real estate loans and whose
principal activity will be limping into line at the discount
window.
According to a recent analysis in Barron 's, five of the
sixbanks involved in pending mega-mergers-Chemical,
North Carolina National Bank (NCNB), C&S/Sovran,
BankAmerica and Security Pacific-rank among the nine
banks with the greatest commercial real estate expo-
sure. 1 On average, commercial real estate loans equaled
120 percent ofthese five banks' year-end 1990 net worth.
From first quarter 1990 to first quarter 1991, foreclosed
property rose at an average rate of 113 percent for the
five mega-merger partners. Foreclosed and problem
loans averaged 41.1 percent of the five banks' net worth
as of March 31.
Bad real estate lending isn't the only vice these banks
share. They also followed the trend to risky leveraged




mega-merger partners ranked among the top 20 banks
in highly leveraged transactions (HLT) lending, with a
combined $16.9 billion in HLT outstanding. That sum
represents 28 percent of all HLT exposure for the 25
lenders who account for most of the banking industry's
highly leveraged financing.2
These numbers say that bigger equals weaker, not
better. Even more important, they suggest that big banks
seeking to grow out of their problems have systemati-
cally misinvested depositors' money in unproductive
ventures that add little to the nation's economic well-
being. Why should we expect them to manage even
larger portfolios with keener regard for the bottom line
or America's economic health?
In an indirect sense, mega-mergers are destabilizing
because they offer phony substitutes for the difficult,
thoughtful changes that might actually reverse bank-
ing's fatal spiral. The longer we defer
real reform of deposit insurance,
regulatory inequalities and other
structural problems, the deeper the
industry will dig its own hole.
Economic Dislocation. Mega-
mergers will generate a number of
problems in the real economy above
and beyond the effects of additional
bailouts on public confidence, con-
sumer buying power and the availa-
bility ofpublic resources. Widespread
unemployment, concentrated in cities
that staked their development on fi-
nancial industry growth, will be the
most obvious consequence ofmega-
mergers. According to published re-
ports, the Chemical-Manufacturers
Hanover Trust (MHT) merger may
result in at least 6,000 layoffs,3 the
Nationsbank merger in 9,000 lay-
offs4 and the BankAmerica-Secu-
rity Pacific merger in 20,000 lay-
offs.
5
These layoffs have been heralded
as a sign of belt-tightening efficiency.
Yet they will disproportionately hit
lower-paid workers, like the employ-
ees a t NCNB Florida whose average
salary and benefits declined from
$17,940 in 1989 to $17,768 in 1990,
according to Sheshunoff Informa-
tion Services.6 The real fat in bank
overhead-CEO salaries, directors'
perks and the like-will never be
subjected to the indignity of a cho-
lesterol test (see Table 1).
By reducing competition, mega-
mergers will narrow the choices available to household
and business users of banking services and raise their
costs. Recent studies of commercial lending data by
Federal Reserve economists confirm the connection
between banking concentration and higher prices for
bank consumers. In addition, mega-mergers probably
will squeeze the supply of credit and other banking
services to already underserved areas of the economy.
Concentration of Wealth. These mergers will result in
excessive concentrations ofeconomic power. They threaten
to put a government seal of approval on the idea that
fewer, rather than more, people should own and control
our most basic economic resources. This past Septem-
ber, the Southern Finance Project released a study indi-
cating that 1991's mega-mergers will have profoundly
adverse effects on competition in local banking markets,
particularly those in affected areas of the West and the
TABLE 1: COMPENSATION AND PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS FOR MAJOR MERGING BANKS
CEO 1990 CEO 1989
AVERAGE AVERAGE CHANGE


















































































CEO 1990/1989: Total compensation includes salary, bonus, deferred compensation and other forms of
cash-equivalent compensation.
AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT 1990/1989: Average salary and benefits per employee at affiliate banks.
CHANGE IN STOCK PRICE: Percent change in stock price from year-end 1989 to year-end 1990.
SOURCES: SNL Executive Compensation Review:
1991 and 1990.
1991; Sheshunoff 1000 Largest U.S. Banks,
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Southeast.7 The study shows:
• According to U.S. Justice Department guidelines, the
BankAmerica and Nationsbank deals would produce
"highly concentrated" conditions in 81 of the 99
counties in Arizona, California, South Carolina and
Washington where the merger partners currently op-
erate competing offices.
• In a quarter of those counties, post-merger concen-
tration levels would rise to more than double the
statistical threshold that signals adverse effects on
competition and triggers antitrust action.
• Despite a record of generally lax antitrust enforce-
ment during the 1980s, the Justice Department chal-
lenged a number of banking mergers over local con-
centration levels far lower than those threatened by
1991's mega-mergers. In 42 of the 99 affected counties
in Arizona, California, South Carolina and Washing-
ton, post-merger concentration levels would surpass
the levels that generated a recent federal antitrust
challenge to Fleet/Norstar's FDIC-assisted takeover
of Maine National Bank.
Bargain-basement government sales of failed banks
and thrifts to NCNB, BankAmerica and Security
Pacific will compound the anticompetitive effects of
1991's mega-mergers. The report terms the BofA-
SecPac deal "the world's largest RTC trophy case,"
since the bailout agency has furnished the two banks
with $24.6 billion in banking resources -74 percent of
all deposits sold by Resolution Trust Company (RTC)
in Western states. The extremely favorable terms of
those deals put BofA-SecPac's rivals at a double
disadvantage.
After a merger, NCNB and Bank of America would
dominate non-local banking markets for medium-
sized business borrowers in South Carolina and parts
A Proposal for Public
Purpose Banking
This outline for public purpose
banks should be considered as a broad
concept, recognizing that many de-
tails remain to be debated and re-
fined by citizens, policy makers and
public-spirited lenders whose expe-
riences provide models for such a
system. The purpose for such a sys-
tem is to restore the widespread own-
ership of financial intermediaries
while investing in a broad spectrum
of resources needed to enhance the
national economic performance and
revitalize communities. A public
purpose banking system should be
built incrementally by expanding the
existing, but tiny, infrastructure, of
public-spirited lenders through a)
the application of tough antitrust
standards to banking industry con-
solidation; and b) the resolution of
bank and thrift failures.
Ownership
Public purpose banks will be
mutually owned by their depositors.
The principal means for defining the
banks' ownership group will be the
communities they are chartered to
serve. By complying with public
purpose standards for governance,
lending and supervision, other tra-
ditional and non-traditional lenders
(community development loan funds
and credit unions, stockholder-owned
development banks and commercial
banks, hybrid intermediaries, etc.)
also could operate as publicpurpose
banks.
Governance
Public purpose banks should be
democratically governed by their
owners, who would be responsible
for selecting a majority ofeach insti-
tution's directors. Accountability
mechanisms linking management, di-
rectors and owners could include:
regular, detailed disclosure offinan-
cial information; annual independ-
ent audits; votes by owners on major
policy initiatives by the banks; and
free access by owners to the vote.
In order to prevent effective con-
trol of the institution passing to a
small number of affluent or power-
ful members (as has happened at
Farm Credit System Production
Credit Associations (PCAs) and many
mutually-owned depositories), the
board should maintain aggressive
member education and involvement
programs.
Capitalization
In order to gain the solid equity
base needed for effective interme-
diation, public purpose banks should
be able to obtain capital through the
following means:
• Equity contributions from the Tier
1 capital of megamerging Bank
Holding Companies (BHCs) that
are proportionate to the divested
branches' percentage of the merg-
ing institutions' total resources;
• Voluntary investments by state
governments, local governments
and pension funds in a special
class of restricted-voting shares;
• A portion of receipts from asset
appreciation fees levied on inves-
tors who resell RTC and FDIC
properties within five years of
purchasing them. One precedent
for this fee is the net recapture
agreement provision of the 1987
Agricultural Credit Act, which ex-
poses Farm Home Administra-
tion borrowers to an apprecia-
tion tax on farm assets.
• Tax-advantaged investments by
individuals in a limited class of
voting shares.
Sources of Funds
Public purpose banks should be
able to access funds through the fol-
lowing mechanisms:
Favorable access to the deposits of
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of the West Coast. Such firms already rely on an
narrow universe of competitors for their primary
banking relationships.
These research findings raise a number of practical
questions for state and federal antitrust enforcers. They
also raise broader questions about who will control the
nation's most vital economic functions-money crea-
tion, the payments system and financial intermediation.
The Supreme Court's landmark Philadelphia National
Bank decision addressed those broad questions with
blunt eloquence. In 1963, the Court wrote:
The fact that banking is a highly regulated industry
critical to the Nation's welfare makes the play ofcom-
petition not less important but more so. If the busi-
nessman is denied credit because his banking alterna-
tives have been eliminated by mergers, the whole
edifice of an entrepreneurial system is threatened; if
the costs of banking services and credit are allowed to
become excessive by the absence of competitive pres-
sures, virtually all costs in our credit economy will be
affected; and unless competition is allowed to fulfill
its role as an economic regulator in the banking
industry, the result may well be even more govern-
ment regulation. It is surely the case that competition
is our fundamental national economic policy, offer-
ing as it does the only alternative to the cartelization
or governmental regimentation of large portions of
the economy.
Recommendations for Change
Government should take the folowing steps to re-
spond to banking mega-mergers and the problems of
concentration, economic dislocation and financial in-
stability associated with them.
1. The standards used by federal financial regulators
megamerging and failed institutions.
Specifically, receiving the deposits
of branches divested by mega-merger
partners in order to comply with
antitrust standards; receiving, on a
first option basis, deposits of insol-
vent institutions resolved by RTC
and FDIC in insured deposit trans-
fers. Public purpose banks also should
receive preferential access to deposit
franchises resolved by RTC and FDIC
in purchase and assumption deals.
Discounted deposit insurance pre-
miums. Public purpose banks should
pay premiums at 80 percent of the
lowest prevailing assessment rate for
other insured depositories. For ex-
ample, if the lowest assessment paid
by banks, thrifts and credit unions to
the FDIC and NCUSIFwere 20 basis
points, public purpose banks would
be assessed 16 basis points.
The discount would give public
purpose banks a structural advan-
tage similar to the low-cost funding
that an earlier type of specialized
lender (S&Ls) received via interest
rate controls. Since we believe it is
necessary to reform the current
deposit insurance assessment, pref-
erence for public purpose banks
ultimately should be replaced by rate
mechanisms built into a system of
flexibility recontrolled rates.
Public Deposits. A federal require-
ment that public bodies (e.g., local
governments, school boards, port
authorities, etc.) and Pension Bene-
fit Guarantee Corporation-backed
pension funds place a designated small
percentage of their total transaction
deposits and a designated small per-
centage of their total non-transac-
tion accounts with local public pur-
pose banks.
Lending Mandate
Portfolio requirements for public
purpose banks should be character-
ized by flexibility and diversificatioa
They must reflect community eco-
nomic needs and national priorities.
• Investments in housing, commu-
nity and industrial development,
health and child care, agriculture
and environmental protection
should constitute no less than 80
percent of the banks' loans (Quali-
fied Public Lender test).
• Public purpose banks should
maintain an annual loan-to-asset
ratio that exceeds by some fixed
percentage the loan-to-asset ra-
tio (averaged over three years)
for Bank Insurance Fund-insured
institutions with less than one
billion dollars in assets.
• Loans should be made within 100
miles of the bank's headquarters
in MSAcounties and within a rea-
sonable (perhaps multi-county)
service area surrounding the bank's
headquarters in non-MSA coun-
ties. Some exemptions may be
made on a case-by-case basis for
syndicating or participating in non-
local ventures of special public
interest.
A reasonable portion ofbank loans
(the exact portion to be deter-
mined annually by the chartering
agency) should involve the banks
in state and federal credit pro-
grams consistent with their over-
all lending mission (e.g., Small
Business Administration, FmHA
etc.).
Loans to a single borrower should
be restricted. Off-balance-sheet
activities and loans to officers, di-
rectors, and their related parties
should be prohibited or severely
restricted.
Banks should have access to a
public purpose secondary market
established through their char-
tering agency.
Banks should provide their bor-
rowers debt mediation and restruc-
turing services financed by retained
earnings and a "check off system.
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to evaluate proposed bank mergers-especially large
mergers that exceed a specified size threshold-should
be clarified, codified and made public. The vague, shift-
ing, subjective and unwritten guidelines currently used
for merger reviews should be replaced by explicit written
standards that:
• Spell out the types of product and geographic mar-
kets to be analyzed;
• Quantify the benchmarks by which competitive ef-
fects are evaluated;
• Fully factor in any existing competitive advantages
that the government has conferred on the applicants;
• Eliminate the "convenience and needs" defense of
banking mergers due to its slippery meaning and
history of usage.
• Consider the effects of mergers on customers such as
middle-market businesses that use non-local banking
markets and are crucial to the health of local econo-
mies.
These measures would reduce the discretion and
enhance the public disclosure of regulatory activity.
Like complementary proposals for "early intervention"
in failing banks and restricting use of the Fed's discount
window, such initiatives would make financial regula-
tion more transparent, more consistent and more clearly
in the public interest.
2. Restrictions should be placed on the portion of
total deposits and IPC deposits that can be controlled by
any single institution on a state, county and Metropoli-
tan Statistical Area basis. If necessary, the federal bench-
mark should preempt more liberal state standards.
3. Banking regulators should direct government and
non-governmental organizations in affected areas to
conduct comprehensive social and economic impact
studies prior to approving bank mergers involving insti-
tutions whose parent companies hold combined assets
exceeding S50 billion. Ifthese studies predict substantial
social or economic dislocation, regulatory approval should
be conditioned on the implementation ofa comprehen-
sive mitigation program, funded by a merger tax on the
merging institutions.
The principal components of merger-mitigation pro-
grams should include (but not be limited to) the follow-
ing elements:
• Strict compliance with the Worker Adjustment and
(continuedfrom page 9)
Such services should be available
to distressed borrowers whose
income falls within a reasonable
standard (e.g., 120 percent) of local
median income and whose loan is
part of the bank's Qualified Pub-
lic Lender portfolio.
Regulation and Supervision
A federal agency, the Office of
Public Banks, should be created to
charter and promote the expansion
of public purpose banks. Like the
Federal Reserve and the FHLB sys-
tems, the Office should maintain re-
serves for and provide backup li-
quidity to public purpose banks. The
Office could be established on a
national, regional or state basis. The
Office should have no regulatory or
insurance functions.
A completely separate (existing
or new) federal agency should serve
as primary regulator and insurer of
public purpose banks, performing
examination and supervision func-
tions. Only a federal charter should
be available for public purpose banks;
however, existing state- or federally-
charted institutions should be al-
lowed to convert to a public purpose
charter if they meet the appropriate
ownership, governance, capitaliza-
tion, portfolio and management tests.
In addition to meeting the reserve
requirements ofthe Office of Public
Banks, public purpose institutions
should meet soundness standards
comparable to those demanded of
other insured financial institutions.
However, the primary regulator
should determine and enforce sepa-
rate risk-weighted capital and re-
serve standards for public purpose
banks. Supervision also should take
into account the case of public pur-
pose banks that choose to operate
on a not-for-profit basis. Public pur-
pose banks should operate with a
state and federal tax exemption.
Failure to comply with lending stan-
dards should result in the loss of the
exemption.
Management
Public purpose banks should
present a qualified management team
and sound management plan in or-
der to receive a charter from the
Office of Public Banks. To help stimu-
late and sustain the infusion of
managerial and technical skills
needed for public purpose banking
success:
The Office of Pub lie Banks should
maintain an active technical as-
sistance division, dedicated to the
support and continuing education
of start-up management teams.
The division should be funded by
mega-merger taxes and a fee on
clearinghouse transactions.
• Matching state-federal EDWAA
funds should be used to train and
place in public purpose banking
jobs a corps of employees who
have been laid off as a result of
banking mega-mergers. The
"Lender Corps" notion also could
be expanded to include the re-
cruitment and placement of re-
tired and other unemployed per-




Retraining Notification (WARN) Act's 60-day no-
tice provision.
• A mandatory 60-day consultation period, triggered
by the WARN notice, in which representatives of
employees, management and government negotiate
alternatives to a closing or layoff.
• Establishment of adjustment committees based on
the Canadian model to oversee retraining, education
and relocation programs for laid-offbank employees.
The Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment
Assistance Act (EDWAA) provides resources for
these joint labor-management committees to be staffed
by an independent third party. The committees are
authorized to survey dislocated workers for outplace-
ment; screen, hire and fire adjustment service provid-
ers; and monitor the re-employment process. For
instance, the United Food and Commercial Workers
have proposed a model assistance center for dislo-
cated Security Pacific and Seafirst employees.
• Use ofEDWAA funds for alternative ownership pre -
feasibility studies that draw up detailed management
plans for converting divested branches into public
purpose banks.
• A "Lender Corps" program, subsidized by EDWAA
discretionary funds and a merger tax, that retrains and
places laid-off bank employees in staff positions at
these public purpose banks. These employees would
help fill the managerial and technical gaps that nag
existing community lenders.
4. Branches divested by mega-merger partners in
order to comply with antitrust standards should be con-
verted to mutually-owned "public purpose banks" with
a lending mission that serve community needs and na-
tional economic priorities. Branches and franchises in
RTC and FDIC conservatorship also should be eligible
for conversion to public purpose banks (see sidebar).
Such banks could be given or sold on a preferential
basis to existing development banks, community devel-
opment credit unions, community development loan
funds or similar intermediaries. Another possibility is
that these banks be chartered separately on the credit
union model, with the community defined as the affinity
group. State and local government units could also
invest in such banks as could pension funds. Portfolio
requirements would reflect broad national investment
needs as well as diversification and other prudent stan-
dards.
The principle behind public purpose banking is simple.
If the government is going to promote or condone a
dramatic concentration in ownership and control of
banking resources, it should simultaneously support a
second tier of financial institutions better attuned to the
nation's credit needs and the American tradition of
widespread economic ownership.
The two-tiered approach is a long-standing reality in
some countries, including nations whose ostensibly
centralized banking systems are relentlessly cited as the
wave of the future by bank consolidation advocates in
the U.S. For example, the German banking system is
best known for its handful ofmammoth universal banks.
But the country also hosts.and promotes through public
policy, a flourishing tier of smaller financial intermedi-
aries that includes thousands of cooperative banks, savings
banks, mortgage banks and postal savings offices. Even
though these smaller institutions have undergone a
merger boom in recent years, Germany still has more
banking institutions per capita than the U.S. has banks
and thrifts.
5. All financial firms should be subject to uniform
licensing and regulation and should meet a modicum of
public obligations in return for their license. The S&L
experience demonstrates the foolishness of leveling the
playing field by lowering it to a less-regulated common
denominator. In order to stabilize the financial system
and achieve real regulatory equality, comparablesound-
ness requirements (capital and reserve standards, dis-
closure, etc.) and prohibitions against conflict of inter-
est and unfair competition should be applied to any
entity that: directly accepts funds from the public for
investment; makes loans to the public using funds other
than its own equity capital and retained earnings; or sells
loans to financial institutions or investors.
Regulatory equality is not an answer to mega-mergers
perse. Rather, it represents an alternative to the banking
industry's broad program of consolidation and decon-
trol. It may or may not imply "more" regulation; itwould
certainly provide smarter regulation. As the body count
mounts in the financial industry, the nation needs to
debate and implement real reform, rather than permit-
ting mega-mergers to delay the banking system's day of
reckoning and make that day vastly more expensive to
taxpayers.
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Preventing Strip Commercial Development:
A Pilot Study in Wake County, North Carolina
Paul M. Kron
Visual experiences along major thoroughfares create
some ofthe first, strongest and most lasting impres-
sions of a community. Residents and visitors form opin-
ions about the quality of life of an area based on what
they see from the roadway. A positive image may affect
people's choices about where to work, live, locate busi-
nesses, retire, or visit. Therefore, the quality of roadside
development is a key factor in determining not only
people's perception of an area, but ultimately, the eco-
nomic well-being of a community.
In December 1989, the Wake County Board of
Commissioners expressed concern about strip develop-
ment along major thoroughfares throughout the county.
The board asked the planning staff to explore ways to
encourage appropriate development along various types
of thoroughfares, to maintain the carrying capacity of
roadways and the visual quality of their surrounding
landscape, and to accommodate the use ofpublic transit.
The board placed special emphasis on the issue of elimi-
nating the county's Highway District zoning classifica-
tion, which allows a very broad range of land uses.
In response to the board's concerns, the Wake County
Planning Department began a pilot study of the NC 55
and US 64 West highway corridors in western Wake
County. These rural, two-lane highways were chosen in
anticipation of increased development pressure due to
the wideningofUS 64 West and the proposed alignment
of the Northern Wake Expressway (west of the US 64-
NC 55 intersection).
PaulM. Kron, ASLA,AICP, received his BachelorofLand-
scape Architecture degreefrom the University ofFlorida in
1984. After receiving his Master of Regional Planning
degree from the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill in 1989, he began working with the Wake County
Planning Department.
What is Strip Development?
Strip development is characterized by congested road-
way corridors lined with a variety of car-oriented com-
mercial land uses such as gas stations, convenience
stores and fast-food restaurants. These corridors usually
lack features which reflect the distinctive character of a
community and often convey a cluttered, repetitive image,
indistinguishable from other strips. Inappropriate land
uses, insufficient building setbacks and landscape buff-
ers, large expanses ofsurface parking, and visually intru-
sive signs are some of the undesirable characteristics
which shape the negative image of strip development.
In addition to its unappealing visual quality, strip
development adversely affects the function ofroadways.
The primary purpose of major thoroughfares is to safely
carry through traffic. However, poorly planned roadside
development with frequent driveways and turning
movements conflicts with this function, resulting in
congestion and hazardous traffic conditions. Because
major thoroughfares are substantial public investments,
it is in everyone's best interest to keep them safe and
uncongested.
How Does Strip Development Occur?
Major thoroughfare corridors generally evolve from
rural highway corridors into continuous commercial
strips, following five phases of development:
The Pastoral Highway: Two-lane country roads lined
by agricultural uses which offer pastoral landscapes,
rural scenery and undisturbed vegetation. Traffic vol-
umes are generally well below the road's capacity, and
access points are few and far between.
Convenience Stores and the Lonesome Billboard: The
rural landscape remains intact, but is dotted with bill-
boards and an occasional convenience store, gas station,
or restaurant.
Public Improvements and Speculation: Roadway im-
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provements improve access to adjacent properties, while
the construction of water and sewer lines raise land
values and increase interest in developing these corri-
dors. Commercial development at this stage generally
occurs in small increments.
Scattered Strip Development: Numerous parcels ofag-
ricultural and residential land fronting the highway have
been converted to commercial uses. Large shopping
plazas or shopping centers begin to appear. Most of the
small out-parcels of remaining vacant land are for sale
for commercial uses. The highway's function as a through-
corridor has been diminished as traffic volume and the
number of turns has significantly increased. Numerous
signs and other devices compete for the attention of
motorists.
Continuous Strip Development: Commercial land uses
occupy virtually all land fronting the highway. Numer-
ous signs divert the driver's attention from the roadway.
Numerous curb and median cuts, turning movements,
and vehicles slow traffic and create hazards. Traffic
volumes exceed the carrying capacity of the roadway,
requiring construction of additional travel lanes.
As development along roadway corridors progresses
through various phases of strip development, solu-
tions for controlling land use, the visual character of
development and access onto highways become in-
creasingly limited and difficult to implement. There-
fore, it is essential to achieve these objectives in the
earliest phases of development.
The Pilot Study Area
The pilot study area includes land within a 1,500- to
2,000-foot wide corridor alongNC 55 and US Highway
64 West in western Wake County. Most of the land
along both highways was zoned Highway District. Much
of the study area falls within Wake County's desig-
nated Perimunicipal Planning Area, where urban de-
velopment is expected to occur within the next 10 to 15
years. All of the US Highway 64 West corridor located
outside the Perimunicipal Planning Area is within the
Jordan Lake water supply watershed.
Development within the Pilot Study Area
The planning department gathered information on
existing land uses, zoning, lot configuration, and visual
resources. This information was used to determine
each corridor's phase ofdevelopment and to select the
most appropriate techniques for preventing strip de-
velopment and mitigating its negative effects.
Both highway corridors appear to be in the first or
second phase of the five phases of strip development.
The primary existing land uses within the pilot study
area are agricultural, residential and vacant (cleared
farmland which is not presently being cultivated). Both
highways are rural in character; however, nearly three-
quarters of the lots directly adjacent to either highway
are zoned Highway District, which allows a variety of
urban uses with a special use permit. In addition, over
half the lots adjacent to each highway have frontage of
400 feet or more, allowing them to meet access spacing
requirements applicable to non-residential uses within
Highway District zoning. If these larger sized lots were
subdivided, the county would find it increasingly diffi-
cult to coordinate development plans to control access
and visual intrusions along these highways.
Vistas, water bodies, natural vegetation, and an ab-
sence of signs define the visual character of these high-
way corridors. Views of sweeping pastoral scenery with
rolling hills, cultivated fields, farm-related structures,
farm ponds, and mature stands of hardwoods and pines
abound.
The visual character ofboth corridors remains intact,
with the exception of a few non-residential uses visible
from the roadway. There is only one billboard in the
pilot study area. About half of the land along both
highways features scenic vistas of the countryside, while
the remaining land is wooded.
Figure A. Aerial View Before Development
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Alternatives to Strip Development
To help the board envision how planning and regula-
tory tools could be used to prevent strip development,
the pilot study used the following illustrations from
Dealing With Change in the Connecticut River Valley
(published by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and
the Environmental Law Foundation in 1989).
Figure A illustrates a typical two lane rural highway,
similar to NC 55 and US 64 West. Land within 400 feet
of the roadway is zoned highway commercial and per-
mits a variety of non-residential roadside uses. Land
adjacent to this commercial corridor is zoned for low-
density, single-family residential use.
Figure B illustrates the typical pattern of develop-
ment resulting from this conventional zoning approach.
Each commercial use has been allowed direct access
from the highway and separate signs. Parking is pro-
vided in front of the buildings, with little landscaping to
screen structures or parking from the roadway or adja-
cent uses. Ingress and egress points provide local access,
but conflict with faster moving through-traffic. Residen-
tial land behind the commercial corridor has been cleared
of trees and retains little of its existing
visual character.
Figure C represents an alternative pat-
tern of development. The same types of
land uses are permitted and the overall
density is maintained, but the area's visual
quality remains intact. This is accomplished
by controlling land uses and signs, cluster-
ing buildings, retaining and using existing
vegetative buffers, and using shared access
points. Access is shared among clusters of
weli-screened commercial buildings, pro-
viding spacious vistas for passing motor-
ists and retaining the free flow of through-
traffic. Single-family homes are also clus-
tered and screened. The overall design is
sensitive to the area's existing landscape
and allows farmers to supplement their in-
come by selling offa portion of their prop-
erty while retaining a larger portion for
agricultural uses. This approach may be
particularly useful along corridors out-
side of the Perimunicipal Planning Areas.
The clustering of uses within these mu-
nicipal transition areas would also pro-
vide more efficient use of public services
such as water, sewer and transit. The clus-
tering of non-residential developments may
also provide a more pleasant pedestrian
experience than strip commercial devel-
opment.
Recommendations and Actions
The pilot study envisions adequate non-residential
development in appropriate locations along attractive
and uncluttered thoroughfares which accommodate safe
and convenient travel. The study calls for control of land
uses, control of the visual character of new develop-
ment, and control of direct access onto thoroughfares.
In February 1991, the Wake County Board of Commis-
sioners endorsed these recommendations and requested
the Planning Department to initiate the following ac-
tions:
Control OfLand Uses
1. Use the Wake County General Development Plan to
guide land use decisions along the pilot study corri-
dors. For the corridor segments within the Cary and
Apex Perimunicipal Planning Areas, use the land use
designations of the detailed joint land use plans to
guide rezoning and special use permit decisions.
Joint plans for the two towns were incorporated into
the General Development Plan in December 1990.
2. Concentrate commercial land uses within the activity
Figure B. Aerial View After Conventional Development
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nodes designated on the joint plans.
3. Redefine non-residential land uses allowed within
Highway District zoning to coincide with the land use
designations of the joint plans.
4. Eliminate Highway District zoning within the non-
Perimunicipal Planning Area portion of the pilot
study, and rezone this area to the appropriate water-
shed zoning districts (R-40W or R-80W).
Control Of The Visual Character OfDevelopment
1. Establish or refine requirements for planting land-
scape buffers, retaining existing vegetation, main-
taining minimum building setbacks, and orienting
buildings and parking areas away from thoroughfares
and toward internal collector roads. Require close
adherence to appropriate county regulations and design
guidelines when considering requests for rezonings,
special use permits, driveways, and median cuts.
2. Encourage cluster development through the site de-
sign and review process.
3. Prohibit or severely restrict signs and billboards along
major thoroughfares.
Control ofDirect Access Onto Major Thoroughfares
1. Limit direct access onto thoroughfares to coincide
with key intersections with major collector roads and
with appropriately designed median cuts. Use inter-
nal collector roads to provide adequate access for
future development.
2. Work with the North Carolina Department ofTrans-
portation to ensure that median cuts are limited to
appropriate locations.
3. Accommodate the use of public transit through the
site design and review process.
Progress Report
In August 1991, the Wake County Board of Commis-
sioners implemented the rezoning ofall propertywithin
the US Highway 64 West corridor and outside of the
Apex Perimunicipal Planning Area from Highway Dis-
trict to low-density residential water supply watershed
districts. Parcels were rezoned to Residential-40W in
the non-critical portion of thewatershed (40,000 square




.' SOW in the critical portion of the watershed
(80,000 square foot minimum lot size).
The two highways addressed in the pilot
study are representative of a dozen thor-
oughfares in the county with extensive
Highway District zoning. However, the
roadway cross-sections, existing land use
patterns, and visual characteristics of each
thoroughfare corridor may be quite differ-
ent. The Wake County Planning Depart-
ment intends to replicate this study to de-
termine for each corridor, the most appro-
priate strategy for addressing concerns about
Highway District zoningand strip commer-
cial development.
The planning department is currently
working with several municipalities to pre-
pare joint land use plans that include other
major thoroughfare corridors in the county.
Once the joint plans are approved, depart-
ment staff will begin preparing rezoning
proposals for these corridors.
The remaining actions recommended by
the pilot study and endorsed by the board
will be addressed as part of the planning
department's current work program, which
includes preparing a comprehensive plan
and rewriting the county's zoning and sub-
division regulations.





Access to credit has long been considered a key com-
ponent of successful economic development. Gov-
ernment policy and programs have consistently sought
innovative financing tools to foster business expansion,
job creation, service provision, and income generation.
Development banking organizations have been created
throughout the United States and Third World, offering
alternative financing solutions to make credit more
accessible to all segments of society. In North Carolina,
the Center for Community Self-Help, Self-Help Ven-
tures Fund and Self-Help Credit Union (collectively
known as Self-Help) constitute the nation's first state-
wide private-sector development bank.
U.S. development banking organizations grew out of
the experience of government and community develop-
ment corporation business development loan funds.
Begun in the 1960s and 1970s, these were generally
federally funded community- or region-based loan funds,
focusing on job creation and service delivery in eco-
nomically distressed areas. They usually operated inde-
pendently of banks or other financial institutions, and
often provided low-interest loans to newly created small
businesses.
Private development banking in the U.S. began in
1978 with the creation of the South Shore Bank in
Chicago. Reflecting the shift in federal policy and pro-
grams, development banks differed from earlier loan
funds. Theywere private organizations, received little or
no public funding, and involved a central "bank" with
several affiliate corporations pursuing related develop-
ment activities. Today, development banks have several
common features. First, a federally-insured depository
institution provides a sizable asset base and a broad
range of development loans for housing and business
Robert Schall has been President of Self-Help Ventures
Fundsince its creation. He is a 1978graduate ofthe UNC
Department of City and Regional Planning.
development projects. Other non-regulated affiliates
provide venture capital, higher-risk debt, technical as-
sistance, advocacy, real estate development, job train-
ing, or other services that complement economic devel-
opment finance. Development lenders differ from con-
ventional banks in three major ways:
• they lend to non-traditional borrowers, economically
disadvantaged groups and depressed regions;
• they forge partnerships between the public and pri-
vate sectors by linking public economic development
programs with private lenders and community or-
ganizations; and
• they combine financial assistance with technical as-
sistance to further development.
Self-Help's Development Bank Genesis
The Center for Community Self-Help in Durham,
North Carolina began in 1980, in the wake of one of the
worst recessions in North Carolina history. Initially, it
provided only technical and managerial assistance to
strugglingemployee-owned companies. After fouryears
of trying to raise capital for these projects, it was clear
that a source of credit was needed as well. In response,
the Self-Help Credit Union and the Self-Help Ventures
Fund were created. These two institutions were launched
in 1984 with $77 raised at a bake sale and now have
combined assets exceeding $36 million. Self-Help has
opened small field offices in Charlotte and Asheville
and plans to open another in the eastern part of North
Carolina in 1992.
The structure of Self-Help's institutions and services
is similar to that of other development banks. The
parent corporation for Self-Help is the Center for
Community Self-Help, a non-profit corporation that
provides technical assistance and advocates for changes
in development policy and programs. The Self-Help
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Credit Union is a federally-insured, state-chartered credit
union that uses interest-bearing savings accounts (money
markets, IRAs and CDs) to build a base for lending. The
Credit Union providesa variety ofcommercial loansand
home mortgages to disadvantaged constituencies. The
Self-Help Ventures Fund is a non-profit corporation
which obtains capital through low-interest loans and
grants from foundations, religious organizations and
private corporations. The Ventures Fund provides the
highest-risk commercial financing at Self-Help and has
begun making a few small real estate investments as well.
Self-Help's development strategy is based on the
belief that ownership is a key motivation for people to
improve their economic position. Self-Help therefore
makes loans to disadvantaged communities and indi-
viduals to buy homes and build businesses. While many
other development groups focus on job creation, Self-
Help concentrates on increasing the wealth of individu-
als and communities. For example, the per capita in-
come of white individuals in the U.S. is roughly twice
that of black individuals. However, the measure of wealth
(net worth) ofwhite families is ten times greater than the
wealth of black families. Lack of wealth can prevent
individuals from improving, or even maintaining, their
standard of living. Our society places great value on the
ownership of property and much of our legal system is
based on property rights. The dream of owning a home
or small business is widely shared in the U.S. But just as
important, Self-Help seeks to address the enormous dis-
parities in the distribution of wealth in our society.
Wealth, or the ownership of personal assets without
debt, gives families a financial base for additional eco-
nomic or educational investment. Families need a cer-
tain level of net worth to send their children to college,
buy or maintain a home, or start and expand a small
business. The principal reason Self-Help expanded into
mortgage lending is to counteract the lack of home
equity among minority entrepreneurs. Minority busi-
nesses are at a disadvantage in raising funds because
borrowing against home equity is the primary source of
capital for small businesses. The establishment of a
business or the purchase of a home provides long-term
benefits for individuals and communities. Local owner-
ship of businesses, particularly in rural communities,
provides a means for establishing and maintaining a
stable economic base. Self-Help uses mortgages and
commercial loans to help disadvantaged groups or dis-
tressed communities build ownership through debt. As
borrowers repay their debt, personal and community
wealth increases.
Self-Help's constituency reflects North Carolina's
unique economic needs. It provides loans to small busi-
nesses owned Dy minorities and women; to businesses
located in depressed rural areas; and to cooperative,
employee-owned and non-profit enterprises that pro-
vide a wider base of ownership within their communi-
ties. In addition, low- and moderate-income families can
obtain mortgages to purchase homes. In 1991, Self-Help
will provide over $10 million in development financing.
Balancing Development Objectives and
Financial Viability
Self-Help and other development lenders work to
expand the limits of lending risk without going bank-
rupt. Self-Help faces unusually high costs compared
with conventional banks because it makes loans to marginal
businesses with inexperienced management and to home
buyers with poor credit histories and less cash for down
payments or repairs. Unlike conventional lenders, Self-
Help faces costs associated with the development and
possible failure of new programs. Self-Help has devised
acorporatefinancial/marketingstrategy that recognizes
the inherent costs and constraints ofdevelopment bank-
ing. It uses three approaches to offset the higher costs of
making risky loans.
External Subsidy. Self-Help seeks continuous, reli-
able sources of subsidy to support new program devel-
opment, technical assistance and advocacy. Subsidies
take the form of direct grants and donations for opera-
tions and loan loss reserves, low-cost loan capital (i.e.,
funds borrowed by Self-Help at low interest and then re-
lent to borrowers) which supports higher risk loans, and
the provision ofpro bono services by outside organiza-
tions. Self-Help also uses grants and donations for a
surrogate "endowment" which is never put at risk. Earn-
ings from this endowment support additional costs asso-
ciated with development lending, and to a limited ex-
tent, replace direct grants.
Lending In Market Gaps. Self-Help pursues markets
that conventional lenders perceive as unprofitable. Its
development targets are chosen primarily on the as-
sumption that there are market gaps in certain commer-
cial and mortgage markets that can be served without
assuming enormously high costs. For example, Self-
Help targets cooperative, non-profit, minority and women-
owned firms as potentially profitable but underserved
markets. Further, Self-Help's NC HOME affordable
mortgage uses an innovative structure (a more flexible,
low down payment mortgage sold to Fannie Mae) to
serve low-income first-time home buyers who would
otherwise not receive financing.
Although economic development literature frequently
advocates this approach, in practice Self-Help has found
that such niches are not always as profitable or extensive
as expected. For example, an apparent market gap in
rural commercial lending often reflects a lack of local
markets and business management talent in these areas.
Marketing and distribution costs are often higher be-
cause businesses are dispersed, and the cost of identify-
ing lending opportunities is higher for lenders. New
credit gaps arise constantly as industries change in re-
sponse to shifts in technology and international ex-
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change rates. Local markets change as a result ofgovern-
mental policies, demographic changes and industry de-
velopments.
Market Displacement. Self-Help has also explored
making lower-risk, profitable loans in certain commer-
cial or mortgage markets that would usually be made, in
whole or in part, by conventional lenders. By combining
these conventional-risk loans with higher-risk develop-
ment loans, the overall portfolio is less costly to manage.
There are two approaches to market displacement
lending. One is for development banks to originate con-
ventional, non-development loans. This method mak-
ing loans that maximize return and minimize risk with-
out consideration ofdevelopment targets. For example,
South Shore Bank in Chicago has used this approach to
establish a foothold in conventional hospital leasing and
in the financingofMcDonalds' franchises. Self-Help has
not used this approach, partly because of geographic
limitations, and partly because of its success using other
approaches.
The method most often used at Self-Help is to partici-
pate fully in loans where a development lender would
DickGilbcrt andfriend at the StoneSoup Restaurant inAshcville, N.C., another Self-Help Ventures Fundproject.
typically take only a subordinate position. In develop-
ment banking, commercial loan packages are usually
split into a fully secured senior loan taken by a conven-
tional lender and an unsecured subordinate loan taken
by a development lender. At Self-Help, the entire loan
package originates in-house, with the Self-Help Credit
Union handling the less risky portion and the Self-Help
Ventures Fund taking on the subordinate, more risky,
piece. Coordination between the two sister institutions
reduces overall risk. Securing each loan with all business
assets allows for more flexibility in foreclosure and
reduces loan losses.
Interest Rates, Risk and Cost of Capital
In addition to a corporate strategy for sustainabilily,
Self-Help has made several strategic choices concerning
loan pricing and the degree of risk Self-Help can man-
age.
Pricing. Self-Help has established a policy of increas-
ing the access to credit to disadvantaged borrowers,
instead of lowering the cost of credit. Both options in-
volve high cost to the lender. On one hand, increasing
access to credit increases
- ^— -— lessor *?**, -» risk, resulting in higher
loan losses (or default
rates) and loan servicing
costs. On the other hand,
reducing the cost of credit
(i.e. lowering interest
rates) gives a lender less
income to cover costs.
Most development lend-
ers must choose between
these two options; it is
rarely possible to subsi-
dize both risk and inter-
est rates. Self-Help be-
lieves that development
lenders, particularly
those that focus on com-
mercial lending, will be
more effective if they
improve access to credit.
The problem facing most
commercial enterprises
is not having credit avail-
able at any interest rate.
Decreasing interest rates
does not help firms that
are considered a credit
risk by conventional stan-
dards, if a lender is not
willing to broaden its
underwriting criteria. The




profits of most commercial borrowers. For example, a
50 percent reduction in interest rates generally only
makes a 1-2 percent difference in a business' net margin,
yet halves revenue to the lender. Therefore, lowering the
cost of credit is an ineffective application of subsidies
because it makes only a marginal difference to a firm. A
more effective strategy is to subsidize risk to reach firms
that are not served by conventional lenders. (The one ex-
ception to this principle is in low-income housing, where
borrowers are enormously sensitive to interest rates. In
this case, interest subsidy is essential to reaching low-
income families.)
Many of the publicly-funded enterprise loan pro-
grams of the 1960s and 1970s focused on both reducing
interest rates and increasing access to loans. Many of
these programs were unable to manage the loan losses
associated with this strategy, despite a relatively unlim-
ited supply of federal subsidy. Today's development
lenders must use more sophisticated management tech-
niques to insure that they can make loans without bank-
rupting their organizations.
Risk. Self-Help manages a portfolio of home mort-
gage and commercial loans that would typically be con-
sidered pooror marginal credit risks by the underwriting
standards of conventional banks. Yet it continues to
operate on a profitable basis, and maintains acceptable
delinquency and loan loss figures. Self-Help has been
able to adapt its staffand finances to manage a degree of
risk that conventional banks avoid. Development bank-
ing expands the management principles ofconventional
banking to include the selected use of technical assis-
tance, greater attention to loan collections, and careful
management of the loan underwriting process.
Self-Help offers technical assistance to companies
with specific weaknesses that they can address with
additional information or training in simple manage-
ment procedures. In many cases, technical assistance is
provided to companies that have not accurately deter-
mined the financing they need to achieve viability. Self-
Help sometimes counsels existing customers to take
advantage of new market opportunities or to address
difficulties that affect company performance. Self-Help
either provides technical assistance directly or refers
clients to other sources (government business assis-
tance programs and private consultants). However, Self-
Help is careful not to replace a client's in-house manage-
ment with outside assistance and advice.
Recognizing that many of its lending programs in-
volve high delinquency rates, Self-Help emphasizes its
loan collection efforts. Delinquency, and therefore higher
loss rates, is a particular threat in home mortgage pro-
grams, where borrowers often have marginal credit his-
tories or unstable income. By remaining in close contact
with borrowers to remind them of their payment sched-
ule, good payment patterns are established early. This
small initial effort saves considerable time and money
later. Self-Help has received high marks on its collec-
tions procedures from Fannie Mae (the largest secon-
dary market mortgage institution), and has kept an
otherwise difficult mortgage portfolio within accept-
able delinquency levels.
Self-Help's underwriting process seeks to expand the
definition ofa "bankable" loan, but also has itsown limit
ofacceptable risk. It is crucial to choose the appropriate
criteria for the approval of a particular loan so that
interest revenues and loan losses are maintained at
predictable levels while insuring that development ob-
jectives are also met. In the absence of research or
practice on the particular underwriting problems facing
development banks, Self-Help has had to learn from its
own successes and failures.
Self-Help's approval process borrows heavily from
conventional banking, but adds several distinct features
of its own. First, underwriting criteria are more flexible,
allowing Self-Help's loan officers to seek out strengths
in one area of a borrower's application to compensate
for weaknesses in another. For example, a commercial
borrower may not have enough collateral to fully secure
a loan, but another factor, such as unusually strong
profits, a partial guarantee, or a large and profitable
contract, maycompensate for the lack ofcollateral. Self-
Help offers several types of mortgages, each of which is
designed to compensate for conventional weaknesses
such as low down payments, less stable personal in-
comes, or problems in credit histories.
In contrast to conventional banking practice, Self-
Help identifies weaknesses in a loan application, and to
the extent possible, helps the applicant to address them.
Loan officers often suggest a variety of ways in which
borrowers can improve their applications. Self-Help
actively seeks the assistance ofgovernment business and
mortgage loan programs to reduce risks. It has packaged
its loans with Community Development Block Grants,
Small Business Administration guarantees and deben-
tures, local government revolving loan funds, and Farm-
ers Home Administration Business and Industry pro-
grams.
Direct lending plays only a limited role in solving
economic problems. Certainly Self-Help, by lending $10
million a year, or even $100 million a year, will not
eliminate poverty in minority families. Self-Help sees
itself as a laboratory for economic opportunity, testing
new development concepts, strategies and programs,
casting aside those that don't work and refining the ones
that do. By setting an example for change in public
economic development programs and private banking,
Self-Help can advocate for larger institutional changes
with greater significance in the fight for economic op-
portunity and justice.
Designing Hillside Protection Studies:
Criteria for Assessing Environmental and
Visual Value
Robin Corathers
44AH too often in this country we think we have two
/V choices.. ..to buy land and lock it up forever in a
park or a preserve, or to let anything-goes, horrible,
schlocky development occur right next door. Those are
not the only choices we have in this country. There is a
third choice, and that is we can have growth and devel-
opment that respects the character of a place and re-
spects and enhances the character of our landscape."
[Edward T. McMahon, director, American Greenways
Program, The Conservation Fund November 25, 1991 at
The Hillside Trust's "Hillside Protection Strategies"
conference in Cincinnati, Ohio.]
The Greater Cincinnati metropolitan area in south-
west Ohio and northern Kentucky is graced with an
extraordinary network of rivers and green hillsides formed
thousands of years ago by three different glaciers. The
forested hillsides and the river systems give the region a
unique visual personality and contribute significantly to
the area's quality of life. This hillside system provides
aesthetic, economic and environmental benefits to the
urban region. The ribbons of green open space offer
spectacular views and opportunities for outdoor recrea-
tion within an urban setting. Real estate values for areas
with views, or adjacent to or near unspoiled slopes,
remain high. The hillsides are an integral part of the
urban ecosystem, providing wildlife habitat and migra-
Robin Corathers is executive director ofThe Hillside Tntst.
She served as project manager for the Tnist's research
projects and editor of the project publication 'A Hillside
Protection Strategyfor Greater Cincinnati.'Shepreviously
worked as an environmental planner for the Ohio-Ken-
tucky-Indiana Regional Council of Governments.
This article is based in part on The Hillside Trust's publi-
cation principally authoredbySamuel V. Noe, an architect
andprofessor in the School ofPlanning at the Universityof
Cincinnati. Noe is a board member of The Hillside Trust.
tion corridors as well as relief from air pollution caused
by urban congestion. The forested slopes prevent soil
erosion and flooding and help conserve energy by shad-
ing buildings in summer and blocking cold winds in
winter.
The hillsides are also quite fragile; Greater Cincin-
nati is known for its costly landslides. U.S. Geological
Survey studies indicate the costs of landslide damage to
private property and public infrastructure in the Cincin-
nati area are in the millions of dollars annually. The
geological history of the region has resulted in an abun-
dance of steep valley slopes, consisting of glacial clays
and till, atop bedrock formations containing high per-
centages of shale. Many hillsides, particularly along the
Ohio River, are not yet in a state of geological equilib-
rium, a condition geologists call "immature topogra-
phy." These factors, together with a high average annual
rainfall, contribute to the area's many landslides. But it
has been insensitive development—cutting into the toes
of slopes, placing fill on slopes, regrading and paving
without controlled drainage-which has triggered the
vast majority of landslides.
In addition to landslide damage, insensitive develop-
ment and poor design have changed the visual character
of the hillsides and destroyed valuable natural areas.
Until about fifteen years ago, the region's hillslopes
remained largely undeveloped, with most construction
occurring in valley bottoms and on hilltops. In the past
decade, however, development pressures for even the
steepest slopes have sharply increased due to several
factors including growing scarcity of undeveloped flat
land; technological advances in earth movement and
retention methods; and the increasing number ofpeople
who want and can afford properties with a view.
About fifteen years ago, the city of Cincinnati recog-
nized the potential danger of insensitive development.
It authorized, by ordinance, the creation of a series of
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"Environmental Quality (EQ) Hill-
side Districts," a zoning overlaywithin
which protective measures could be
established. To date only half of the
hillsides in the city have been desig-
nated as EQ Hillside Districts, and in
most of the region the need for hillside
protection has not been addressed at
all.
Two factors have limited the adop-
tion of rational and well-coordinated
policies and enforcement of stringent
regulations by local governments. Many
government officials in the region have
supported unlimited growth and have
been reluctant to antagonize develop-
ers who they believe would oppose
hillside protection measures. The lack
of information about the "environ-
mental and visual sensitivity" of hill-
sides within the various political juris-
dictions located in the Greater Cin-
cinnati metropolitan region has fur-
ther hampered protection efforts.
In 1988, the Hillside Trust, a private nonprofit re-
gional land conservation organization, began research
to provide better information about the hillsides and
better tools for both its internal decision-making and
that of local governments and others concerned with
hillside development and preservation. The Trust for-
mulated the following research questions:
• How should the relative aesthetic qualities and envi-
ronmental significance of hillsides in the metropoli-
tan area be assessed?
• How can these distinctions be related to vulnerability
to landslides and development?
• What are appropriate guidelines and regulations for
cases where sensitive hillside development is pos-
sible?
• Which hillside areas deserve priority attention by the
Hillside Trust and local governments?
The Hillside Trust recognized that a comprehensive
approach to hillside protection was needed to guide
sound decision-making. The Trust's staff and consult-
ants designed two research projects: one documenting
the relative sensitivity of hillside land and identifying
critical natural areas for priority attention; and a second
creating a model set of hillside development guidelines
and regulations for adoption by local government.
The Hillside Trust proposed to study the impact of
development type, density, design, and location factors
on perceptions of visual quality and how to incorporate
As this viewform Price Hill illustrates, Cincinati's hillsides combine with the Ohio River toform a natural
visual amenity. '
this information into planning guidelines, goals and
objectives. The Trust contacted the U.S. Forest Service
for technical and financial assistance. It was referred to
the Forest Service's North Central Forest Experiment
Station in Chicago, Illinois, which had done research on
visual preferences and visual resource assessment meth-
odology. The Forest Service had developed a Visual
Management System for evaluating wilderness areas,
but this methodology had never been adapted to urban
environments nor incorporated into a geographic infor-
mation system (GIS). Previous research by the North
Central office in Cincinnati had shown that intense
hillside development can negatively affect perceptions
of visual quality.
The Forest Service expressed interest in this proposal
and agreed to fund it through cooperative research
grants. In addition to the Forest Service funding, the
Hillside Trust was able to secure financial and in-kind
service support for the two studies from eleven state and
local government agencies and private foundations, and
from scores of individual professionals and interested
citizens who volunteered their expertise and time.
Although the geographic scope of the Trust's re-
search is limited to the Greater Cincinnati region, its
work should be of interest to elected officials, planning
and zoning commissioners and staff, design and devel-
opment professionals, park commissioners, civic lead-
ers, and others concerned with land conservation and
development issues in hilly terrain. In particular, the
design of the Hillside Trust's studies and the develop-
ment guidelines they generated can serve as a useful
model for any community where visually and environ-
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mentally sensitive hillside land is subject to develop-
ment pressures.
GIS Study
The Hillside Trust decided to use a computer-based
geographic information system (GIS) to provide a flex-
ible and dynamic technique for identifying critical hill-
side areas. The Trust was particularly interested in using
GIS to:
• analyze potential implications ofalternative patterns
of development and planning strategies;
• "zoom in" on specific sites within the electronic maps
and conduct more detailed studies;
• allow government planners to adjust the parameters
of the analytical models, based on new or different
environmental data or different sets of assumptions;
• rapidly update data and produce maps at different
scales.
Although the Hillside Trust is concerned with the
protection of hillside resources in a five-county area in
southwest Ohio and northern Kentucky, it limited its
GIS study to hillsides in Hamilton County, Ohio and
Kenton County, Kentucky, an area encompassing over
370,500 acres. This choice was made because of budget
constraints and because these counties had their own
GIS or are in the process of establishing one.
Research involved the design and testing of system-
atic computer-based models for mapping hillsides. The
analytical models rate hillsides according to relative
visual quality, landslide hazard, value as ecological cor-
Exiaisivc grading of hillsides makes them susceptible to landslides and erosion.
ridors, and susceptibility to development. These classi-
fications were then combined to produce six color-
coded composite maps showing the relative sensitivity
of hillside land to development.
The analytic models determined the data require-
ments for the study. Hillside Trust staff collected exist-
ing information from a great range of original mapping
scales and map types. Landsat satellite imagerywas used
to update land use/land cover information. The map
coordinate system selected was Universal Transverse
Mercator (UTM). ERDAS GIS software was chosen for
use in digitizing map information into the GIS because
of its efficiency and speed. This transformation process
was closely monitored because of inaccuracies in some
of the original maps.
The Trust hired Dr. Douglas Way, a landscape archi-
tect and consulting principal of the SWA Group, Co-
lumbus, Ohio, to develop the analytical models in con-
sultation with the Hillside Trust staff and an advisory
committee, which included representatives from all the
supporting organizations. Dr. Way produced a series of
primary and summary maps of hillside characteristics
for the project.
Analytical Composite Maps
Visual Sensitivity. An analytical model was developed
to determine the relative visual quality of hillsides as a
function of land use/land cover, proximity to water,
diversity of positive landscape elements, and location
along the hillside upland edge (the area most critical to
visual impact.) Natural, undeveloped areas that are
close to water, with a combined view of forests, water,
agricultural land or pastures, and are located on the sen-
sitive hillslope rim were rated highest in vis-
ual quality and sensitivity.
Landslide Potential. Geological infor-
mation, degree of slope, and evidence of
previous landslides were used to determine
relative landslide hazard. In the Greater
Cincinnati region, landslides are most likely
to occur over the Fairview and Kope bed-
rock formations, which contain up to eighty
percent shale. Slope instability is also asso-
ciated with areas located above lacustrine
clays. Steepness of slope and proximity to
existing areas of instability are the other
primary variables in determining landslide
susceptibility.
Ecological Corridors. While studies in
other parts ofthe country have documented
the importanceof forested areas in filtering
particulates from the air and absorbing and
storing carbon dioxide, in moderating tem-
peratures, and in preventing erosion and
flooding problems, little data of this variety
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was available in the Cincinnati area. After conferring
with biologists and other scientists, the Hillside Trust
instead decided to focus on the region's pattern of
ecological corridors which sustain an abundance and
variety of wildlife.
The relative importance ofeach hillside as an ecologi-
cal corridor was determined by examining land charac-
teristics (upland, rim, slope, valley), proximity to water,
land use/land cover, and, where documented, the pres-
ence of threatened and endangered species. The most
ecologically significant zones are found in linear pat-
terns following the valley systems, along the lower edges
of the hillslopes, adjacent to or near streams, and in
areas least disturbed by development.
Development Susceptibility. Susceptibility to develop-
meni was determined to be a function of proximity to
existing or proposed infrastructure, including major
roads, water and sewer lines; construction costs deter-
mined by topographic slopeand flood hazard; and visual
amenities including view potential from hillside edges
and valley slopes.
of the "macro" analysis while also including appropriate
"micro" information.
In this example, desirable land was defined as all
undeveloped parcels larger than one acre, rated as hav-
ing high visual sensitivity or high quality as an ecological
corridor and rated as having a high susceptibility to
landslides. To this was added more detailed site infor-
mation including analysis of soil types and their limita-
tions for development; the quality of tree stands as
evaluated by a U.S. Forest Service landscape architect
who visited and mapped the sites; and information on
zoning, land ownership, mean value of parcels, and
proximity to major roads.
Development Guidelines
The Hillside Trust used several research methods to
formulate appropriate guidelines for development in
sensitive hillside areas (see figure 1):
• survey and evaluation of legislation in use by cities
and counties with similar topographic features through-
out the United States;
Summary Maps
Visual and Environmental Sensitivities. To identify
critical hillside areas, a composite map was generated
that identifies hillsides with high visual sensitivity, high
quality ecological corridors, and high landslide poten-
tial. This analysis provides multiple justifica-
tion for protection of these areas through per-
manent preservation methods and through use
of more stringent controls over any future
proposed development.
Hillside Action Priorities. As an additional
planning tool, the summary map of visual and
environmentalsensitivities was overlaid on the
map of development susceptibility to identify
where high quality sensitive hillside areas are
also susceptible to future development. This
composite map locates higher quality hillsides
that are under less pressure at the present time
for development and may therefore be less
expensive to acquire, as well as hillsides of
relatively low visual and environmental sensi-
tivity where it would be appropriate for local
governments to direct future development.
Detailed Small Area Analysis
To demonstrate future applications of the
GIS-generated data base for local planning
decisions, the Hillside Trust chose a "micro"
area spanning the Ohio River and illustrated
how a hypothetical study could be conducted
for parkland acquisition. The detailed model
illustrates the change in scale from regional
analysis to site-specific study, using the output
consultation with environmental, development, plan-
ning and legal professionals;
adaptation of the U.S. Forest Service's visual prefer-
ence methodology, focusing on a number ofdevelop-
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Figure 1. Hillside Guidelines Development Process
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ment variables and their visual impact in an urban
environment;
• testing of packages of guidelines in a University of
Cincinnati studio of advanced architecture and plan-
ning students, supervised by respected developers in
the region.
Guidelines Derived from Existing Ordinances. Provi-
sions of ordinances from around the country were clas-
sified by type, relative degree of importance, and type of
legislative or policy vehicle in which they are most
appropriately included. The guidelines determined to
be most applicable to Greater Cincinnati are a range of
public policies; guidelines for regulation ofsubdivisions
of hillside land; zoning to regulate density of hillside de-
velopment; zoning to regulate the visual character of
hillside development; earthwork, erosion, drainage and
sedimentation controls; and retention and replanting of
vegetation.
Guidelines Derived from the Visual Preference Study.
Hilltop highr'tse development should be reservedfor afewpromontorypoints
subject to rigorous design review to ensure proper hillcrest setbacks.
The Hillside Trust incorporated public opinion into its
research using a modified version of the U.S. Forest
Service's visual preference technique. The results of the
visual preference study provide an additional basis for
recommendingwhere green space should be maintained
on the hillsides and where different types of buildings
relate harmoniously with the natural environment. The
conclusions drawn from the visual preference study also
lend an additional measure of legitimacy to the recom-
mended guidelines, because the guidelines embody the
views of both a representative sample of local residents
as well as professionals whose work involves different
aspects of hillside development in the region.
The Trust hired John Decker, an architect, landscape
architect, and professor at the School ofPlanning at the
University of Cincinnati, to design and execute the
visual preference research. The visual preference rating
technique involved the creation of thirty views of char-
acteristic hillsides, developed to different densities with
a variety of building types, and sited in a range of differ-
ent patterns. Most of the views were syntheti-
cally constructed, using a computer imaging proc-
essing system to overlay photographs of a range
ofbuilding types on a photograph ofan undevel-
oped hillside. This permitted virtually every likely
pattern of hillside development in the collection
of views.
Lay and professional research participants
were asked to indicate the extent to which they
found each image either attractive or unattrac-
tive and, in cases of extreme reactions, the rea-
sons for their feelings. The responses were then
tabulated, and later used in the development of
a number of guidelines.
After examining the thirty images, each re-
spondent was asked to work with an operator of
the computer imaging system to construct a
preferred pattern of hillside development. The
total collection of "ideal" development patterns
on the same hillside were then superimposed on
one another in order to locate the portions of
the hillsides most often left free ofdevelopment
and the locations most commonly favored for
different types of buildings.
The Hillside "Studio": Testing Guidelines in
the Design Laboratory. Midway through the
project, a number of promising approaches to
regulation of hillside development began to
emerge from the preliminary analysis of legisla-
tion in use in other parts of the country. These
approaches were evaluated and compared in an
urban design studio exercise at the University of
Cincinnati to test their appropriateness to local
conditions. In this exercise, four teams of ad-
vanced students from the Department ofArchi-




to design housing developments on two
prototypical Cincinnati sites.
Two of the teams were assigned an
eight-acre mid-slope site in an inner
suburban location. They were instructed
to design approximately fifty dwelling
units, with each team followinga differ-
ent package of development regulations.
The other two teams were assigned a
hillcrest site on a commanding ridge
overlooking the Ohio River and down-
town Cincinnati. They were also given
different development regulations and
asked to design between forty and one
hundred dwelling units, in either a high-
rise or a less obtrusive configuration.
All teams were assigned a practicing residential prop-
erty developer as a mentor and design critic.
During the exercise, the students were asked to evalu-
ate the set of guidelines they were working with and to
suggest revisions which might contribute to designs
more compatible with the hillside environment. The
design work continued based on these revised guide-
lines.
The range of architectural designs produced in the
studio proved useful in determining appropriate loca-
tions for different types ofbuildings on the hillsides. The
testing of the different development guidelines em-
ployed proved equally helpful. Some guidelines had the
potential to place unreasonable economic burdens on
project developers. Others, while preventing many forms
of inappropriate development, also had the effect of
constraining particularly imaginative and desirable
approaches to design. This studio experience influenced
final choices for recommended development guidelines,
primarily by helping to discard less promising approaches.
Expert Consultation. Throughout the course of this
project, the Hillside Trust consulted with a variety of
hillside development professionals, including soil scien-
tists, geologists and geotechnical engineers, landscape
architects, architects, urban designers, ecologists, biolo-
gists, planning officials, developers, and attorneys.
These experts assisted in the design of the study,
participated in workshops on development guidelines
and seminars based on the studio work, served as sub-
jects in the visual preference study, and reviewed drafts
of the Hillside Trust's final report.
In all, 162 guidelines were generated from the study.
The Hillside Trust believes some of these guidelines are
essential to any local government's hillside protection
program. Of particular note are the Trust's recommen-
dations for public policies that call for designation of
hillside protection overlay districts; establishment of
hillside development review boards; public acquisition
of fee simple title or conservation easements for critical
Housingdevelopment appropriate to a mid-slopesite localedon an innersuburban hillside. Densityhas been kept
low by clustering the units, leaving much oftheforested hillside untouched.
hillside areas; and requirements that public and quasi-
public agencies be bound by hillside protection meas-
ures in addition to private property owners. Other guide-
lines are recommended or optional and should be con-
sidered a menu from which local governments can pick
and choose, depending on their own needs and unique
circumstances.
Next Steps
The Hillside Trust announced the completion of its
research projects in June, 1991, at its annual member-
ship meeting, and received favorable local press cover-
age. Since that time, the organization has been working
to familiarize elected officials, planning and zoning
commissions and staff, design and development profes-
sionals, and concerned citizens with its findings and rec-
ommendations through public presentations and meet-
ings. On November 25, 1991, The Hillside Trust held a
day-long public conference entitled "Hillside Protec-
tion Strategies for Greater Cincinnati" which 175 pro-
fessional and lay people from Kentucky and Ohio at-
tended. Speakers covered topics from specific land con-
servation methods to regulating the quality ofdesign for
hillside development.
[Editor's note: A full account ofproject methodologies,
findings and recommendations can befound in The Hill-
side Trust's three-volume publication A Hillside Protec-
tion Strategy for Greater Cincinnati. Copies of the three-
volume set ofbooks summarizing The Hillside Trust 's re-
search are available for $45 plus $5.50 for shipping and
handling. Copies of the hillside development guidelines
data base are available in either3 1/2" or5 1/4"floppy disks
for $25 plus $3 for shipping and handling. For more
information about The Hillside Trust 's work, write or call:
The Hillside Trust
3012 Section Road at French Park
Cincinnati, Ohio 45237
(513)531-6334]
The Circus Comes to Town:
The RTC's Affordable Housing Program
and its First North Carolina Auction
David Spence
Sharon Levy
On a late June afternoon, hundreds of spectators sat
waiting in the yellow heat beneath a big-top tent.
Young couplesfanned children with folded programs and
craned to see any movement on stage. Finally as organ
musicfilled the tent, the masterofceremonies ascended the
stage and barkedgreetings into the microphone. Thecrowd
was captivated. But this was not the circus they had come
to see. This was Resolution Trust Corporation 's Afford-
able Housing Program!
Since the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) took
its first steps toward implementing the Affordable Housing
Disposition Program in 1989, housing advocates, con-
gressional sponsors, and the press have lambasted the
agency's efforts to reconcile the competing statutory
objectives of the program. In recent months, criticism of
the program has been calmed somewhat by the RTC's
success at moving huge numbers of low-priced homes in
highly publicized public auctions. Unlike the RTC's
earlier attempts to dispose of its affordable housing
inventory, the auctions have been spared most criticism,
attracting instead the fanfare and hyperbole of a big-top
circus coming to town.
As part of its sales blitzkrieg covering the Northeast,
Southeast, and Southwest, the RTC sponsored a series
of real estate auctions in North Carolina's Research
Triangle Park in late June 1991. All of the properties,
ranging from undeveloped land to small shopping cen-
ters, were taken from the real-estate-owned inventories
of Raleigh's failed First Federal Savings and Loan. The
107 properties eligible for the Affordable Housing Dis-
position Program were sold during to two days of auc-
tioning. Under the program, low-priced single-family
and multi-family homes are separated from other assets
David Spence is a graduate student in business andlawand
Sharon Levy is a second-year graduate student in the
Department ofCity and Regional Planning at the Univer-
sity ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill. Both are interns at
the Downtown Housing Improvement Corporation in
Raleigh, NC.
and marketed for 90 days solely to low- and moderate-
income households, nonprofits, and public agencies.
According to its own criteria, the RTC considered the
North Carolina affordable housing auction a smashing
success.
The question remains whether the auction was a
success when measured in terms set by statute, housing
advocates, public agencies, and the buyers themselves.
How Bank Regulators Became Housing
Providers
In early 1989, President Bush unveiled a comprehen-
sive plan to resolve the crisis in the thrift industry and, in
Bush's words, "to promote a safe and stable system of af-
fordable housing finance through regulatory reform."
The President's bill was sent for review to the House
banking committee, chaired by Rep. Henry Gonzalez
(D-Texas). A stalwart advocate of affordable housing,
Gonzalez had witnessed a dramatic decline in conven-
tional housing assistance from the federal government
during the Reagan Administration. Federal budget au-
thorizations for housing had fallen from 5.2 percent of
total budget authority during the Carter Administration
to just 0.73 percent in Reagan's 1989 budget (then still
in effect).
1 When the President's bill emerged from the
banking committee it carried an amendment creating a
90-day right of first refusal for low-income families and
nonprofit and public agencies on low-cost properties
held by failed Savings & Loan institutions (S&Ls). The
amendment met immediate opposition from the Ad-
ministration which foresaw delay and increased costs
resulting from the affordable housing provisions.
In response, Democrats in the House and Senate
cited three justifications for attaching housing provi-
sions to the bailout bill. First, Democrats would support
the President ifthe statute were structured not simply as
a bailout, but also as a restatement of industry objec-
tives. Second, the housing program would be a means of
giving otherwise wasted properties back to the taxpayers
asked to fund bailout. Third, directing the properties to
marginal families now would prevent the government
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from having to pay housing subsidies for the same fami-
lies in the long run.
With the cost of the bailout was growing an estimated
S20 to $30 million every day, President Bush relented,
and on August 9, 1989, signed into law an amended
version of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).2 The Resolution Trust
Corporation and its Affordable Housing Disposition
Program were born.
An Affordable Housing Program in a Hostile
Agency
The mission of the RTC is to manage and resolve
failed thrifts and to dispose of any residual assets that
result from resolution. In retrospect, perhaps the great-
est error of FIRREA's drafters was the attention given
to resolution of thrifts instead of asset disposition. Al-
though the RTCoperates under thesupervision ofan in-
dependent oversight board, the RTC's "exclusive man-
ager" is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). Traditionally, the focus of the FDIC was to
consult with and preserve a troubled institution and,
only rarely, to attempt to sell the institution as a whole.
This tradition has had a profound impact on the RTC's
ability to discharge its duty as a seller of individual, low-
value assets.
Also complicating the RTC's mission are Congress'
three seemingly contradictory mandates. FIRREA re-
quires that the RTC dispose of residual assets in a
manner that maximizes return and minimizes losses to
taxpayers; minimizes the impact on local real estate and
financial markets; and maximizes the preservation of
the availability and affordability of residential properly
for low- and moderate-income individuals.3 Through-
out the process of translating Congress' intent in the
Affordable Housing Disposition Program into work-
able regulations and procedures, RTC staffand housing
proponents have continually butted heads over how to
balance these mixed mandates.
The efforts of the RTC to implement FIRREA's
housing provisions were further undermined by a staff
that was ideologically unsuited to the task of providing
affordable housing. The former bank regulators who
staffed the RTC were unversed at breaking up an S&L
and selling its properties. They werealso uninterested in
protecting low-cost homes from real estate investors
and marketing them to low- and moderate-income families.
More than a year after the RTC's start-up, affordable
housing sponsor Barney Frank complained that RTC
officials "were offended at the notion that they should be
worrying about poor people. They didn't want to be a
social agency, having responsibilities that would inter-
fere with their high finance."4 As the housing program
has grown, however, the RTC has hired a multitude of
workers from other government programs serving the
poor.
Outline of the Program
Under FIRREA and subsequent amendments, the
Affordable Housing Disposition Program requires that
the RTC give a 90-day right of first refusal on "eligible
properties" to "qualified purchasers." If the RTC does
not receive an acceptable offer during the 90-day period,
it may sell the property on the open market.
FIRREA defines qualified purchasers as households
earning no more than 115 percent of the area median
income, as well as nonprofit organizations or public
The efforts of the RTC to implement FIRREA's
housingprovisions were further undermined by
a staff that was ideologically unsuited to the
task ofproviding affordable housing.
agencies. Eligibility guidelines for properties are the
same as those found in sections 203(b)(2) and 221 (d)(ii)
of the National Housing Act. One-unit dwellings may
not have an appraised value of more than $67,500; two-
unit dwellings, not more than $76,000; and three-unit
dwellings, not more than $92,000. Multi-family housing
may have a maximum appraised value of $29,000 to
$58,392, depending on the number of bedrooms.
Qualifying households may purchase single-family
homes subjct to a commitment to occupy the homes as
their principle residence for at least one year. The RTC
may recapture 75 percent of profits if a home is sold
prematurely and without good cause. Qualifying agen-
cies and nonprofits must agree to rent or resell single-
family homes to families earning no more than 80 per-
cent of the area median income. When purchasing multi-
family properties, agencies and non-profits must reserve
at least 20 percent of the units for very low-income ten-
ants, defined as households earning no more than one-
half the area median. An additional 20 percent of the
units must be reserved for low-income tenants, or those
earning 80 percent of the area median. These percent-
ages apply in the aggregate to all complexes purchased,
which allows for some segregation of low-income ten-
ants in a few buildings. To prevent drastic segregation,
Congress has recently amended program guidelines to
Table 1 . Target Incomes Calculated as Percentage





















require at least a ten percent low-income presence in all
buildings purchased. The program also limits rent paid
by low- and very low-income families to roughly 30
percent of their incomes.
The 90-day marketing period operates slightly differ-
ently for single-family and multi-family properties.
Marketing of single-family residences is confined to the
90-day period, during which time the RTC considers
bids on a first-come-first-served basis. When choosing
between substantially similar offers, the RTC gives first
preference to households, second preference to non-
Out of all sales functions, however, it is in mar-
keting that the RTC has best earned its new
nickname, ''Ready to Change.
"
profits, and last preference to public agencies. After
the 90-day period, all restrictions on sales are lifted.
For multi-family properties, the RTC will only accept
written "notice of serious intent" from qualifying pur-
chasers during the period. After 90 days, organizations
have an additional 45 days to submit a bona fide offer.
The RTC then chooses the best offer or, in the event of
a tie, the offer that guarantees the highest percentage of
low-income residency. In contrast to the single-family
rules, even if eligible multi-family properties pass through
the protective marketing period unsold, residency re-
strictions remain effective against future for-profit pur-
chasers.
FIRREA created clearinghouses to act as informa-
tion conduits between the RTC and qualifying purchas-
ers. These may include state housing finance agencies,
district Federal Home Loan Banks, or national non-
profits approved by the RTC. Originally, the RTC
Oversight Board did not contemplate that clearing-
houses would participate in marketing beyond dissemi-
nating of information. By contrast, the Oversight Board
has created technical assistance advisors to help more
actively in matching purchasers, properties, and financ-
ing. The RTC may also enter into agreements with
private real estate brokers, auctioneers, and bulk-sales
specialists.
RTC Under Fire
From the outset the RTC and its housing program
were beset by problems that FIRREA's drafters did not
anticipate. Many S&Ls taken over had kept confusing
and incomplete records, which made the process of
securing title to foreclosed property long and cumber-
some. To its later regret, the RTC chose to assign
properties to its regional and consolidated offices based
on the location of the thrift that had secured the prop-
erty rather than the location ofthe property itself. Given
the geographic dispersion of investments by failed thrifts,
all fourteen consolidated offices maywell be responsible
for properties in Dallas, for example. At the same time,
the RTC gave branch offices very little authority to
approve sales. Regional offices independently could
only dispose of assets with book values of less than
$25,000; consolidated office staffcould only sell proper-
ties worth less than $10,000.5
The most persistent pitfalls within the affordable
housing program, however, have been caused not by
statutory or organizational limitations, but by the in-
transigence of the RTC Oversight Board. Until early
1991, the board refused to liberalize policies on price
discounting, seller financing, or marketing as permitted
by statute. In each area the board justified its position by
arguing that Congress' first two mandates ofmaximizing
the return to taxpayers and minimizing the impact of
RTC sales on local markets, outweighed Congress' third
mandate, to maximize the availability of affordable housing.
Harangued by congressional sponsors and housing
advocates, the RTC grudgingly has made concessions.
Ironically, the open market has been the force behind
the most progressive policy changes in the program.
Changes in Pricing, Seller-Financing, and
Marketing
The conundrum of the affordable housing program's
conflicting mandates is nowhere more obvious than in
pricing policy, yet pricing is the puzzle that the RTC, as
the offspring of the FDIC, is least equipped to solve.
FIRREA allows for discounting to the extent necessary
to make housing sales to lower-income families and
nonprofit or public agencies feasible. Still, the RTC did
not allow price discounting when affordable housing
sales began in early 1990. In May 1990, the oversight
board allowed properties to be discounted by 15 percent
after four months of marketing-one month after quali-
fying purchasers lost their 90-day right of first refusal.
Predictably, sales prices throughout the program's first
several months averaged just under 100 percent of
appraised value, or S42,000.6 Not until discounts were
increased to 20 percent after "some reasonable market-
ing" did sales prices drop to 93 percent of appraised
value, or $35,700, during the last quarter of 1990.7
The pressure to liberalize discounting policies in-
creased through early 1991 and culminated in an amend-
ment to FIRREA that allowed the RTC to set prices on
single-family properties without regard to any minimum
purchase price.8 Although housing advocates lobbied
the RTC on ideological grounds, the economics of car-
rying costs provided a far stronger argument for dis-
counting. Using the carrying costs on HUD-foreclosed
homes as a proxy, theRTC incurs about $18.25 a day on
each eligible property.9 With 7,500 single-family homes
in the program in May 1991, the RTC was paying about
$137,000 per day to carry its inventory. Probably more in
response to these costs than to the calls of housing advo-
cates, theRTC began to sell homes at deep discounts. By
FALL 1991
29
the end of August 1991, the average price of a single-
family home had dropped below $25,000, or just 67.4
percent of appraised value. 10
Seller-financing has developed at much the same
pace as pricing policy, slowly at first, but more rapidly of
late. Because Congress had notice from Housing and
Urban Development, Farmer's Home Administration,
and Veteran's Administration housing programs that
seller-financing would be a necessary evil of selling to
qualifying families and nonprofits, FIRREA allowed
below-market-rate mortgages to be taken by the RTC
on affordable properties. However, in its "Strategic Plan
for the RTC," the oversight board viewed seller-financ-
ing as a marketing tool to be used onlywhen banks would
not lend and only if the cost of financing is offset by a
higher purchase price. In early 1990, the board imposed
a requirement that all seller-financed loans be salable on
the secondary market within one year, effectively pre-
cluding the use of flexible underwriting standards with
low-income buyers. Finally, more than a year into the
program, the oversight board approved up to $250 mil-
lion in seller-financing for eligible properties with 5
percent down payments and below-market interest rates
for families who were already renting the homes they
would buy.
Even since the agency's change of heart, financing
arranged by the RTC has been slow to materialize
because of organizational delays. Sales of securitized
packages of nonconforming mortgages required an
amendment to FIRREA, granting RTC employees
immunity from securities violations. Reservations of
mortgage revenue bonds issued by state housing agen-
cies resulted in commitments of almost $200 million by
August 1991, though gun-shy banks in the Southwest
had been willing to lend only a fraction of that amount.
Wary of becoming a long-term lender because its statu-
tory life extends only to 1996, the RTC currently will
finance sales only when no private lender comes for-
ward. The RTC almost always avoids that situation by
enticing first-mortgage lenders with "soft second"
mortgages of 5 to 20 percent of the sales price.
Out of all sales functions, however, it is in marketing
that the RTC has best earned its new nickname, "Ready
to Change." At the close of 1990, the RTC took stock of
its efforts and found that 75 percent of its properties in
number represented only 10 percent of the dollar value
of its inventory and that only one percent of the RTC's
proceeds were derived from affordable housing sales. 11
The RTCwas acquiring low-value properties at approxi-
mately three times the rate it was selling them. 12 In
response, the agency set a goal of selling 80 percent of its
properties worth less than $100,000 by June 30, 1991. 13
In order to meet its goal, the RTC planned more than
100 sales events to dispose of 9,000 affordable proper-
ties throughout the Northeast, Southeast, and South-
westduringl991.Ataffordablehousingfairs, theagency
prequalified families on the spot and provided informa-
tion about area properties and financing. At silent auc-
tions, qualifying families submitted sealed bids on ad-
vertised homes. At absolute auctions, such as the one
staged in North Carolina, competitive bidding began at
$5 and continued until every property on the block was
sold. To support these events, the RTCsigned contracts
with nearly 100 government agencies and nonprofits to
act as clearinghouses and technical assistance advisors.
The RTC set up booths offering bilingual services in
Houston supermarkets and at the Texas state fair. The
agency began publishing its own newsletter, The Silver
Lining, for bankers, nonprofits, local governments, and
brokers. Even high school cheerleaders and bands were
recruited to perform at auctions.
The RTC met its goal. By June 30, 1991, contracts had
been signed on 85 percent of the 5,200'single-family
homes that were on the books at the end of 1990. As
those who prepared for or participated in the North
Carolina auction can attest, the pace of sales was stag-
gering. When the RTC approached the North Carolina
Housing Finance Agency (NCHFA) in late May about
hosting the auction, the RTC had experienced an 80
percent increase in sales during the preceding month.
Preparation for the North Carolina
Affordable Housing Auction
The affordable housing auction held in Research
Triangle Park on June 22 and 23, 1991 was among the
first auctions sponsored by the RTC Mid-Atlantic Con-
solidated Office in Atlanta. NCHFA, which had previ-
ously contracted to act as an RTC clearinghouse, was
given notice of the auction just four weeks before the
first bids were cast. The RTC offered some support out
of Atlanta, but responsibility for publicity, bidder pre-
qualification, and inventory preparation fell mainly on
Hudson & Marshall, the Georgia auction company under
contract with the RTC; First Federal Savings & Loan,
the Raleigh S&L which owned all the real estate to be
auctioned off; and NCHFA. NCHFA in turn contracted
out much of the prequalification of buyers to the Down-
town Housing Improvement Corporation of Raleigh,
the Durham Affordable Housing Coalition, and the
Orange Community Housing Corporation.
Even before the auction team knew the size of the
inventory or the financing available, newspaper and
Table 2. The North Carolina Auction in a Nutshell
Dates June 22-23, 1991
Number of Properties Sold 99
Average Appraised Value $67,720
Average Sales Price $54,300
Average Buyer Income $30,170
Bids per Property (Approximate) 8
Total Proceeds (Preliminary) $5,400,0000
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radio ads were run and stories appeared in the local
press. NCHFAset up a toll-free phone line to receive in-
quiries, and Hudson & Marshall scrambled to print-up
a brochure for distribution. The RTC gauged that 300
prequalified bidders would be needed to support sales
comparable to previous auctions. Instead, NCHFA was
swamped with more than 2,000 inquiries, resulting in
1,000 families interviewed and 800 prequalified to bid.
Hudson & Marshall sponsored a "buyer's awareness
preview" outside Raleigh a week before the event to
familiarize bidders with the properties and the auction
process; the crowds were five times that expected, back-
ing up traffic all the way to Interstate 40.
Prequalification interviews for bidders lasted thirty
minutes and consisted ofthree steps. Staffdetermined if
the income figures supplied by the family fell below the
program limit of 1 15 percent of the area median, which
in the North Carolina auction ranged from $35,150 for
a single-person household to $50,250 for a family of
four. Very few families exceeded the limits. Second, staff
calculated the maximum bid a family could offer based
on their income, current debts, and financing available.
Finally, staff attempted to answer questions about the
auction process and the homes available. Unfortunately,
prequalifiers had little information to offer. Virtually
nothing was known about the properties other than
their location and size and that many were new townhouses
built by bankrupt developers. Though no inspections
were performed, prequalifiers learned that some homes
still lacked carpeting or bathtubs. RTC policy prevented
bidders from learning the appraised values of the prop-
erties.
Two financing packages were available to bidders.
The RTC was willing to provide 30-year, fixed-rate
mortgages at 9.75 percent to purchasers who could not
find private financing. Families earning below 80 per-
cent of the area median income would pay 3 percent
down; other qualifying purchasers would pay 5 percent
down. The RTC would pay all closing costs and mort-
80-100% of Median
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gage insurance, leaving buyers to pay property taxes,
title insurance, and homeowner's dues. NCHFA had re-
served $500,000 for first-time home buyers who earned
less than 80 percent of the median income. The NCHFA's
15-year, fixed-rate financing of 80 percent of the sales
price could be combined with a second mortgage from
the RTC for 15 percent of the price on the same terms.
Winning bidders were not required to use either RTC or
NCHFA financing, and it appears few did.
Results of the Auction
The bidders assembled under the big-top tent at the
affordable housing auction could not be described as a
crowd of welfare recipients or "the working poor," nor
were they a herd of disguised yuppies. It appeared that
theRTC had achieved the same economic and racial mix
that characterized earlier fields of bidders in Boston,
Savannah, and Austin. However, winning bidders at the
North Carolina auction appear to have been decidedly
more middle-class than RTC buyers nationwide. Pre-
liminary results of the auction show the average income
of a North Carolina buyer was $30,500, or 87 percent of
the area median. 14 For the first twelve auctions in the
mid-Atlantic region, buyer income averaged $23,900, or
69 percent ofthe area median. 15 Nationwide in June, the
averagebuyer incomes was just $23,200, or 61 percent of
the national median. 16
The jump in incomes of North Carolina buyers is
partly attributable to the quality of the housing sold.
Whereas homes sold in Savannah required major struc-
tural repairs and New Orleans properties were being
used as crack houses, most North Carolina properties
were recently constructed in healthy neighborhoods.
Still, price as a percentage of appraised value, which
should remain constant, was slightly higher in North
Carolina than in other regions. Although in June the
RTC was collecting under 78 percent ofappraised value
nationwide, 17 properties in June's auction sold for 80.2
percent of appraised value. 18 The $5.4 million in bids
that the RTC accepted at the
auction set a record for af-
fordable housing sales, rep-
resenting a whopping 105








Figure 1. Income of Buyers as a Percentage of Median Income
Conclusion: Is the RTC
Fulfilling Its Mandate?
After the North Carolina
auction drew to a close and
the big-top tent was rolled up
for transport to the next town,
one had to wonder if this was
what Congress had in mind




Program. Strange as its means were, had the RTC finally
managed to reconcile its competing statutory mandates?
There is no doubt that the auction strategy serves the
program's first goal of maximizing the return to taxpay-
ers on the sale of properties. To illustrate, the RTC
settled for 87 percent of appraised value on single-fam-
ily homes at the June auction. Prior to using auctions,
the RTC was recovering about 96 percent of appraised
value. However, had the North Carolina properties
been marketed individually, the carrying costs incurred
in just six months would have reduced the RTC's net
proceeds to the 86 percent recovered in June. Through
the auction, the RTC was rid of most properties in a
matter of weeks. Speedy disposition of properties is
even more necessary now that Congress has made single-
family properties in conservatorship, as well as receiver-
ship, permanently eligible for the affordable housing
program. The change will roughly double the number of
units in the program's inventory.
The goal of minimizing the impact of RTC sales on
local real estate markets is also probably served by the
auctions. Prior to FIRREA's passage, brokers and de-
velopers feared that if the RTC dumped its real estate
there would be a sharp drop in local prices. The real evil
has turned out to be the uncertainty that takes hold of
local markets when the RTC delays disposition of its
huge inventories. The sentiment among builders and
economists now seems to be, "Go ahead and get it over
with." 19
Whether auctions serve the last goal of maximizing
affordable housing opportunities is, of course, the issue
no one agrees on. By the words of the statute, the RTC
easily meets its mandate: FIRREA requires sales to
families below 115 percent of the national median, and
in August the RTCwas selling its single-family homes to
households earning an average of 59 percent of the
national median20 The Low Income Housing Informa-
tion Service has cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the
RTC's reports,21 but even so, the RTC has a 50 percent
margin ofsafety on its income levels. Most objections to
the program, therefore, are aimed at the way the RTC
sells its affordable housing. The auction is a classic
example of a forum where truly low-income families are
easily muscled out by the middle-class or by households
whose incomes understate theiractual upward mobility.
The disparity in buying power is more pronounced in
situations where almost no information is provided on
the homes to be sold.
As the RTC has struggled to implement the afford-
able housing program, it has been subjected to a double
standard - one based on the lenient income limits of
FIRREA and the other based on the potential that
housing advocates see for providing affordable homes.
After a year of auctions, the RTC has lost most of its
illusions of being able to sell 1,000 properties a month,
all at near-market prices. By the same token, the pro-
gram's detractors have become more realistic about the
RTC's capacity for doing good. Soon after the North
Carolina auction, program sponsor Rep. Barney Frank
conceded, "We have got to compare [the program] with
perfection on the one hand and nonexistence on the
other."22
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Promoting Affordable Housing
Through Land Use Planning
Paul Ketcham
Scot Siegel
Metropolitan Portland lies between the Coast Range
and Cascade mountains ofnorthwestern Oregon, at
the head of the fertile Willamette Valley. Bordered to the
north by the Columbia River, anddividedgeographically by
the south-north running Willamette River, the three-county
metro area covers 3,026 square miles. As home to nearly
1.2 million people, metropolitan Portland contains 43
percent ofOregon 's totalpopulation. This areaputs to the
test the state 's innovative land use policies, which range
from natural resource conservation and historicpreserva-
tion to economic development, urban design, and housing.
A major quality of life issue for any city is meeting the
housing needs of its citizens. When an urban area is
characterized by exorbitant housing costs or blighted
and crime-ridden neighborhoods, livability suffers.
Nationally, housing affordability is declining. A 1990
study of housing costs by the Harvard Joint Center for
Housing Studies, shows home ownership rates falling
since 1980, especially among young households. The
report states nearly 2 million more households would
own homes today if ownership rates had remained at
1980 levels. At the same time, rent levels remain at
record highs. The report concludes that, "persistent
declines in home prices and rents are unlikely on a
national scale."
Despite clear need for more affordable housing, local
governments are often reluctant to zone land for lower
cost housing types-such as apartments and townhouses,
and single-family homes on small lots. Typically such
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housing is discouraged because it contributes less tax
revenue than do commercial and upscale residential
developments. Exclusionary zoning of this kind hurts
low and moderate income households by distancing
them from employment centers, safe environments and
good schools, alienating them from community affairs
and, ultimately, adding to their cost of living.
Such zoning practices are difficult to change without
strong action by state legislatures. First, Congress and
federal administrative agencies have limited power to
regulate the use of real property, whether to conserve
land or to specify residential development standards.
Congress may prohibit granting federal housing money
to localities which fail to meet land use and housing
affordability targets, as recommended by HUD Secre-
tary Kemp to President Bush in July 1991. However, the
amount of federal housing money is small, and that
money is not generally given to suburban jurisdictions
where the problem exists. Second, the volume, variety
and local texture of most land use decisions make a
direct national role unfeasible. Third, federal courts
have ruled that the failure of states or localities to
provide affordable housing does not violate the U.S.
Constitution. 1 Fourth, attempts to overturn exclusion-
ary zoning laws through litigation in state courts have
largely been ineffective.2 At the local level, there is little
incentive to adopt "fair housing" laws and forego eco-
nomic development. Only states can effectively mandate
local governments to fairly allocate planned housing
types.
The first state legislative effort to attack the afford-
able housing problem directlywas included in Oregon's
Comprehensive Land Use Planning Program. Estab-
lished in 1973, this program has served as a model for
land use planning and growth management in other
parts of the U.S. Similar state-wide comprehensive plan-
ning laws have since been enacted in Florida, Georgia,
Rhode Island, New Jersey, Maine and Vermont.
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Oregon Statewide Goal 10 (Housing)
In implementing the Comprehensive Land Use Plan-
ning Program, Oregon targeted 19 specific areas of
concern. Goal 10 was adopted in 1974, during a period
of record growth, and addresses housing issues. It re-
quires local governments to provide, through plan poli-
cies and zoning, reasonable opportunity for people ofall
income levels to obtain adequate and affordable hous-
ing. It states:
Toprovidefor the housingneeds ofcitizens ofthe state.
Buildable lands for residential use shall be invento-
ried and plans shall encourage the availability of
adequate numbers of housing units at price ranges
and rent levels which are commensurate with the
financial capabilities of Oregon households and al-
low for flexibility of housing location, type and den-
sity.
The state's Land Conservation and Development
Commission (LCDC) evaluates local plans for confor-
mance with statewide goals. LCDC has interpreted Goal
10 to encompass the legal principles of fair share and
least cost housing. This means that each community
within a region must consider the broader housing needs
of the region in arriving at a fair allocation of housing
types (i.e., single-family versus multiple-family hous-
ing). For that community, "needed housing" is defined
by Oregon law to include multiple-family and attached
single-family dwellings (i.e., townhomes and duplexes),
and manufactured housing. 3
Goal 10 also mandates that local standards and pro-
cedures for reviewing applications to build "needed
housing types" (housing types determined by local gov-
ernments to be within the financial capabilities of pres-
ent and future area residents) must be "clear and objec-
tive." For example, a local government could not deny
an apartment project proposed on a site zoned multiple-
family simply on the ground that neighbors do not want
it on their block. There must be legal reasoning sup-
ported by local and state planning regulations to deny
the project. This requirement is codified in Oregon
planning law.4
Metropolitan Portland: A Model for
Regional Land Use Planning
The Portland region has received a good deal of
attention for its urban growth boundary policy, which
helps to contain urban sprawl. Less known, however, are
the region's innovative pro-housing policies, without
which the urban growth boundary (UGB) would quickly
A View ofDowntown Portland and Mount Hood
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be pushed to the breaking point by low-density housing.
Among other things, housing policies that encourage
development inside the UGB help ease pressures to
develop beyond the line, or expand it outward.
Critics ofgrowth management argue that UGBs arti-
ficially inflate land costs, thus reducing housing afforda-
bility and inhibiting economic development. However,
in the Portland area, housing costs relative to per capita
income have remained well below those ofmany compa-
rable (unregulated) U.S. cities. In addition, over the last
decade the region has prospered. A 35 percent increase
in population is expected in the region over the next 20
years.
The Portland metropolitan area (areas of Clackamas,
Multnomah, and Washington counties within the re-
gional UGB) developed the Metropolitan Housing Rule
to address housing and land use issues. It requires local
plans to:
• provide adequate land zoned for needed housing
types;
• ensure that land within the the Metropolitan Port-
land (Metro) UGB may accommodate the region's
projected population growth;
• provide greater certainty to thedevelopment process;
and
• reduce housing costs.
Local governments are responsible for developing
comprehensive plans that comply with the Metropoli-
tan Housing Rule. These plans are then reviewed and
approved by the Land Conservation and Development
Commission (LCDC). The Housing Rule (OAR 660-
07-000) requires that:
• each of the region's three counties and its 24 cities
develop comprehensive plans which allow for a new
construction mix that includes at least 50 percent
multi-family or attached single-family units; and
• plans allow development to occur at certain mini-
mum target housing densities.
In the City of Portland, the target density is ten units/
buildable acre (una); most suburban areas are to aim for
either six or eight una. Clear numeric targets provide a
yardstick by which community efforts to promote more
compact and affordable housing can be measured. The
idea behind the rule is that development at higher
densities (or on smaller lots) will result in more afford-
able housing.
1990 Housing Study
In response to the request from the National Growth
Management Leadership Project5 for an evaluation of
Oregon's affordable housing land use policies, 1000
Friends of Oregon and the Home Builders Association
of Metropolitan Portland undertook a joint housing
study in May 1990. In the context of a recent boom in
Portland-area construction and rising home prices, our
two organizations wanted to find out how well the
region's "pro-housing" land use policies have promoted
development of affordable housing.
Study Approach:
compare actual housing development patterns with
planned patterns;
• evaluate, by housing type and density, affordability of
post-Housing Rule development;
• determine the reasons why actual development den-
sities may depart from planned densities.
Study Objectives:
• measure the link, if any, between housing costs and
implementation of the region's housing policy; and
• recommend land use policy changes to better pro-
mote affordable housing within the region and the
state.
The study area (Metropolitan Portland) was defined
as areas of Clackamas, Multnomah and Washington
counties within the Portland Metropolitan UGB. Juris-
dictions within this area must comply with the Metro-
politan Housing Rule.
The period selected, 1985 to 1989, afforded an oppor-
tunity to examine the Metropolitan Housing Rule un-
der a healthy economic regime. Prior to 1985, Oregon
and much of the country were in an economic recession.
Building permit and planning approval data were
used to compare actual development patterns with the
housing policies in local plans. Planners, developers and
project engineers completed surveys used to assess the
reasons why development occurred as it did. Regional
and national data on income, home sales, rents and
demographics were collected from several agencies and
private data sources to assess housing affordability.
Local governmental planners and a project advisory
committee reviewed study methods, verified data accu-
racy, and provided insight on technical and policy-re-
lated issues.
The Study's Findings
The volume of multiple-family and attached single-
family development increased dramatically. Some com-
munities developed more multiple-family and attached
single-family units during the 5-year study period than
had been planned for a 20-year period under pre-hous-
ing rule proposals. In 1978, for example, only 371 ofone
jurisdiction's planned housing units were multiple-family.
During the study period, the same jurisdiction devel-
oped 1,575 multiple-family units, or 425 percent of its
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original 20-year plan. In other words, the demand for
multiple-family housing during the years 1985-89 could
not have been met in some Portland communities under
pre-Housing Rule zoning. This finding is significant
because it confirms that the regional fair share principle
called for by Goal 10 is, at least partially, being realized.
Of all multiple-family and attached single-family units
developed, 74 percent were in projects of moderate to
low density (less than 25 una); and fewer than 5 percent
represented densities higher than 60 una (see Figure 1).
These findings allay concerns that minimum density
rules would create huge housing "megaliths." High-rise
apartment buildings, typically associated with down-
town centers, often exceed 150 una.
Low apartment vacancy rates through the study pe-
riod (indicating strong demand, or consumer "need")
attest to the performance ofthe housing mix rule. In July
1991, the multiple-family housing market remained firm
in most Portland communities with the average vacancy
rate at 5 percent-rates in excess of 7 percent generally
indicate an oversupply of units.
Analysis of income and rent data showed 77 percent
of the region's households could afford to rent the
region's median-priced apartment in 1989. (Housing is
assumed to be affordable when households spend 30
percent or less of their gross income on housing.) By
contrast, only 67 percent could afford mortgage pay-
ments on the median-priced two bedroom home; the
figure drops to 43 percent for a three bedroom home.
Yet, housing affordability (the percentage of a region's
households able to purchase the region's median-priced
house) is 2-3 times greater in the Portland region than in
comparable West Coast metropolitan areas (San Diego,
Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Jose, San Francisco,
Seattle).
The proportion ofmultiple-family and attached single-
family housing increased dramatically. During the study
period, multiple-family and attached single-family hous-
ingaccounted for over half (54 percent) ofall residential
development. Prior to the Housing Rule, these more af-
fordable types represented only 30 percent of the re-
gion's planned 20-year supply of housing. New units
were primarily in apartments, rowhouses, duplexes, four-
plexes and mixed residential-commercial buildings.
The proportion ofsmaller and more affordable devel-
oped single-family lots increased. Historically, exclusion-
ary zoning favors larger, more expensive home sites by
prohibiting development on smaller lots, regardless of
market demand. By mandating that certain minimum
densities be allowed, the Metropolitan Housing Rule
removed a regulatory barrier to development and en-
couraged the creation of smaller (higher-density), less
costly lots. Throughout the region, the density of new
development increased by 13-32 percent over pre-Hous-
ing Rule levels, with the most significant gains in single-
family development.
Multiple Family Density Distribution
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Figure 1.
Single Famliy Lot Size Distribution
for Portland Area Development: 1985-89
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Figure 2.
Single-family development on large lots (or at lower
densities) continued to play an important role in Port-
land area housing markets. The study found develop-
ment was nearly evenly distributed among three lot size
categories: small (smaller than 7,000 square feet (sq.
ft.)), medium (7,001 sq. ft.-9,000sq. ft.),and large (larger
than 9,000 sq. ft.) (see Figure 2).
New single-family homes on large lots sold for twice
as much as small-lot homes. An analysis of new home
sales during 1988-90 shows that 25 percent of the re-
gion's households could afford the median-priced house
in a small lot subdivision (5,000 sq. ft. - 7,000 sq. ft.);
however, the figure drops to 16 percent for medium lot
developments (7,001 sq. ft. - 9,000 sq. ft.), and 2 percent
for large lot subdivisions (9,001 sq. ft. - 15,000 sq. ft.).
Jurisdictions where building activity was greatest gener-







targets. This finding suggests a tendency to develop at
higher densities when growth is contained and land is in
high demand. That is, given rapid development of a
finite supply of buildable land, economics tend to favor
dividing suitable land into smaller, less costly single-
family lots; and building a greater proportion of mul-
tiple-family housing where zoning allows. This is impor-
tant information for policy-makers relying on the UGB
to control urban sprawl while promoting lower-cost
housing development.
Importantly, the decrease in single-family lot sizes
and the increase in the proportion ofmultiple-family de-
velopment helped to further other regional urban growth
objectives, such as cost-effective expansion of public
transit and basic infrastructure.
Research into the causes of reduced project densities
showed very little citizen opposition to development at
higher densities. Of five density-limiting factors ranked
by project engineers and local government planners,
citizen opposition to higher densities was one of the two
least influential—the other being inadequate public
facilitiesorservices. This finding is significant because it
refutes a common argument that "NIMBY" attitudes
are a major deterrent to lower-cost housing develop-
ments. Although citizen opposition may reduce housing
density in isolated cases, the analysis shows the leading
causes ofunderbuilding are, in order ofsignificance: de-
velopment economics (profit motive), site constraints,
and regulatory constraints.
Land developed dwing the snidy period was under-
utilized to the extent that remaining lands cannot absorb
the region 'sprojected housing needs under current zoning.
Although housing development in metropolitan Port-
land during the period 1985 to 1989 exceeded density
and mix targets for a 20-year planning period, single-
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family development consumed land planned for devel-
opment at densities higher than were built. While mul-
tiple-family projects region-wide were built at 90 per-
cent of unit capacity or planned density during the study
period, single-family subdivisions were built at only 66
percent of capacity (see Figure 3).
Since most jurisdictions predicated compliance with
the Metropolitan Housing Rule on the assumption that
development could occur at maximum allowable densi-
ties, the 34 percent density shortfall on these subdivi-
sions is significant. Importantly, 12 percent of all single-
family subdivisions developed were on lands zoned for
multiple-family housing. This improper implementa-
tion of zoning accounts for 2,485 (26 percent) of 9,570
units foregone due to underbuilding of planned densi-
ties. As a result of underbuilding, insufficient residen-
tially-zoned land remains to meet the region's projected
housing needs over the remainder of the planning pe-
riod.
While nationally unprecedented gains have been made
in the past fifteen years, the Portland model ofmanaging
growth to promote affordable housing is not flawless.
Gains made over the past decade will erode through the
planning horizon (2000) without adjustments to the
Metropolitan Housing Rule. "Downzoning" or a reduc-
tion of planned densities does not appear to be war-
ranted in any part of the region.
Conclusions
Implementation ofthe Portland Metropolitan Housing
Rule removed a regulatory constraint to development of
multiple-family housing. Requirements that local plans
zone sufficient quantities of vacant land for multiple-
family housing opened the way for development. For
example, the 11,110 multifamily units approved in
Washington County jurisdictions in five years nearly
equaled the 13,893 that had been planned planned to be
built over 20 years under the pre-Housing Rule plans.
Overall, multiple-family development comprised 54
percent of all new housing in the region during thestudy
period. Significantly, the study found that 77 percent of
the region's households can afford to rent the median-
priced two-bedroom apartment, while 67 percent can
afford mortgage payments on the median-priced two-
bedroom home, and only 43 percent can afford the
median-priced three-bedroom home.
Implementation ofthe HousingRule removed a regula-
tory constraint to development ofmore affordable single-
family housing on smaller lots. Single-family housing
developed on a wide range of lot sizes, with about two-
thirds of the homes built on lots smaller than 9,000 sq.
ft.; this compares with an average lot size of 13,000 sq. ft.
allowed under pre-Housing Rule plans. The study found
that homes on large lots (larger than 9,000 sq. ft.), on the
average, cost twice as much as homes on small lots
(smaller than 7,000 sq. ft.).
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The Portland region 'spro-housingpolicies have helped
to manage regional growth while promoting affordable
housing. If the same amount of development realized
during the study period had occurred at the lower, pre-
Housing Rule densities, it would have consumed an
additional 1,500 acresofplanned residential land within
the UGB-an area over two square miles in size. Due to
this savings in land area, an additional 14,000 housing
units can be built within the UGB. In short, combining
Portland's urban growth boundary and "pro-housing"
policies helps to manage growth and promote afford-
able housing development.
The study showed the importance of land use plan-
ning in providing for the housing needs of a metropoli-
tan region. It shows that zoning, under a state-mandated
housing rule, can be used to increase the availability of
more affordable housing types and to make home own-
ership more attainable by diversifying thestock ofsingle
family housing sites to include smaller lots.
Although the study finds that land use planning is a
necessary (and, in Oregon's case, successful) tool in
promoting affordable housing, the study does not mean
to imply that planning, alone is a sufficient means for
achieving that end. An important study recommenda-
tion is that Portland area governments strategically plan
for areas where shortages ofaffordable housing are most
critical, focusing land use policy and public and private
investment toward the production and rehabilitation of
low cost housing.
Recommendations
In order to recover lost housing opportunities and to
better implement comprehensive plans throughout the
region, Home Builders Association of Metropolitan
Portland and 1000 Friends of Oregon recommend that
local governments, Metropolitan Portland and LCDC
adopt a new interpretation of the Metropolitan Hous-
ing Rule. Since the Housing Rule presently only speaks
to planned development, a new interpretation should
recognize that Goal 10, through the Housing Rule,
mandates development standards.
In brief, we recommend stronger housing density and
mix standards for promoting affordable housing and
efficient urban growth through the planning horizon,
and beyond. The recommendations focus on amending
the Metropolitan Housing Rule, and extending its prin-
ciples to other parts of Oregon. The following recom-
mendations spell out how such standards should be
applied.
Mandate Minimum Density Requirements. Develop-
ment codes normally specify a maximum allowable density
for each zoning district. Housing may be built at density
levels up to the maximum or "ceiling" density allowed by
a particular zone. Our study found that such zoning
often leads to unplanned development patterns-for
example, by allowing encroachment of single-family
(lower-density) development onto lands designated for
multiple-family (higher-density) use. This report rec-
ommends minimum density standards or density "floors"
to help retain buildable land for multiple-family and
lower-cost single-family housing. Single-family housing
should not be allowed to develop on lands zoned for
multiple-family use.
We also recommend a planned unit development
(PUD) approach to all single-family subdivisions in
higher-density zones. This would require, for instance,
that no more than 25 percent of vacant developable
land, per project, be divided into large single family lots
(i.e., greater than 9,000 sq. ft.). LCDC should enact
minimum density standards by amending the Portland
Metropolitan Housing Rule. In short, minimum density
requirements should help to ensure that the region's
projected housing needs are met by retaining lands that
are needed for multiple-family developments; and pro-
moting site and building designs which utilize smaller
lots for single-family housing.
Reform Local Planning Procedures and Regidations.
Local planning procedures and regulations (such as site
design standards) played a less significant, though,
important role in reducing housing opportunities in the
Portland area. The study recommends LCDC apply the
"clearand objective" policy during its periodic review6 of
local comprehensive plans and development codes to
address this problem. For example, LCDC should re-
view parking space standards and determine whether
codes are unnecessarily reducing the number of units
which can be built on a given site.
Demonstrate Compliance with Regional Housing
Objectives. In drafting comprehensive plans, Portland
area governments were required to accommodate their
fair share of the region's population growth. In demon-
strating compliance with the Housing Rule, they made
assumptions about future housing development within
their respective jurisdictions. Local governments as-
sumed density, redevelopment and infill potential, and
the amount of land needed for streets and other services
would be at certain levels. LCDC approved these plans
in the early 1980s, aware that each jurisdiction's ability
to accommodate projected growth was predicated on
the development assumptions.
Upon testing those key assumptions, we found that
the region is meeting its general urbanization (density)
objectives, but in the long-term several jurisdictions will
likely fail to meet the more demanding housing targets
underGoallOand the Metropolitan Housing Rule. The
study therefore recommends amending the Housing
Rule to provide a better check on the procedures used to
show compliance with Goal 10. A "justification of as-
sumptions" by local governments during periodic re-
view is one way to provide such a safeguard.
Monitor Regional Growth Patterns. This study shows
the critical importance of comprehensive data collec-
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tion in evaluating regional development. The report
recommends that local governments monitor urban
development and transmit standardized data to the Metro
(the region's planning agency), and that Metro use this
information to assess the adequacy of the region's land
supply for meeting Housing Rule objectives. Assuming
that Metro's Regional Land Informations System (RLIS)
operates as planned (operational by 1992), the agency
should be able to deal with this task.
Evaluate Regional Growth Patterns. Metro should
recommend to LCDC that it mandate rezoning, or other
policy measures, to offset identified local shortages of
needed housing types. To carry out this process, Metro
and local governments should identify where requiring
higher densities would best support infrastructure in-
vestments such as the regional transportation system.
For example, zoning should encourage higher-density
housing near major existing or planned employment
centers and transit stations. Finally, Metro should initi-
ate a study to evaluate whether currently prescribed
Metropolitan Housing Rule mix and density levels are
adequate for meeting housing, transportation andother
urban goals.
Develop Regional Strategies for Affordable Housing.
Metro should develop strategies to preserve and reha-
bilitate the region's supply of special needs and low- and
moderate-income housing. In addition, unmet housing
needs should be identified, and a regional strategy should
be developed to focus land use policy and public and
private investment toward meeting unmet needs. Re-
gional strategies for affordable housing should address
the "fair-share" distribution of housing responsibilities
among the jurisdictions of the region, including the
provision of supporting social services.
Mandating a Statewide "Urban Housing Rule." The
issues which drove the adoption of the Metropolitan
Housing Rule for the Portland area are now challenging
other urban areas in Oregon. In its 1990 Urban Growth
Management Study, the Department of Land Conserva-
tion and Development found in four case study areas
housing costs rising faster than personal income by as
much as 300 percent. In addition, affordable multiple-
family housing types are increasingly in short supply
outside the Portland metro area. This report recom-
mendsLCDC adopt a statewide "Urban Housing Rule,"
similar to the Metropolitan Housing Rule, to address
these concerns in appropriate jurisdictions.
Public Education on Growth Management and
Housing. Finally, there is a great need to provide infor-
mation to the public, within and outside the state, about
the benefits of Oregon's land use planning program.
Many communities elsewhere are struggling to imple-
ment innovative housing policy. Citizens and policy-
makers, locally and nationally, do not understand the
connection between land use policy, housing affordabil-
ity, and cost-effective urbanization. The report there-
fore recommends LCDC, Metro and local governments
in the Portland area publicize the benefits of regional
housing planning, using Portland as a national model.
[Editor's Note: This article was adaptedfrom the Execu-
tive Summary of 1000 Friends of Oregon and the Home
Builder'sAssociation's housingstudy, 'Managing Growth
to Promote Affordable Housing. ' Copies ofthe report can
be obtained by writing Paul Ketcham, Senior Planner,
1000 Friends of Oregon, 534 SW 3rd Ave., Suite 300,
Portland, OR 97204.]
Notes
'In James v. Village ofValticrra (1971) the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee a "right" to affordable
housing; and in Construction Industry Assoc, ofSonoma Co. v. City
ofPetaluma (9th Circuit, 1975), the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld
large-lot zoning used to "cap" the city's population.
^The famous Mt. Laurel cases inNew Jersey in 1975 and 1983 resulted
in little exclusionary zoning actually beingchanged. The court ruled
against exclusionary zoning provisions in Wayne Brilton v. Town of
Chester (New Hampshire Supreme Court, 1991), but the long term
effects of this case are yet to be determined.
3See ORS Ch. 197.303; OAR 660-07-035.
4See: ORS Ch. 183 & 197; OAR 660-07-015.
^A Coalition of 17 state-level conservation organizations working in
growth management and land use policy
"The Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development
reviews local comprehensive plans every 5-7 years.
Central American Refugee Planning
Julie Locascio
In the 1980s, "Central America" became synonymous
with civil war, economic collapse, human rights abuse,
and refugee movement. Because of the complexities of
Central American politics, refugees from the region
have elicited a highly mixed response, ranging from
humanitarian to indifferent to hostile. Individuals and
agencies trying to serve these refugees or resettle them
are faced with constraints that are more political than
logistical.
Since the 1970s, 2-3 million refugees have been dis-
placed from their homes in Central America. Central
American refugees have presented an unprecedented
challenge to planners, relief workers, economists, poli-
ticians, administrators, community leaders, and others.
Analysis of the refugee planning enacted so far in the
region illustrates both appalling and exemplary approaches
that can shed light on refugee planning elsewhere.
History of International Refugee Planning
The modern system of international refugee assis-
tance evolved from the migration situations of World
Wars I and II. The U.N. set up the Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees to supervise the care of
refugees, which was to be entrusted to asylum nations.
The birth of UNHCR was accompanied by the 1951
Convention on Refugees, which pertained only to those
who had become refugees because of events prior to
January 1, 1951 (even though UNHCR was authorized
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in Regional Planningfrom the University ofNorth Caro-
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Costa Rica on a TinkerFoundation research grant to work
on her Departmental Paper, "CentralAmerican Refugee-
Planning: Analysis ofthe Regional Response (with a Spe-
cial Focus on Costa Rica) and Universal Lessons on
Refugee-Planning. " This article is based on her Depart-
mental Paper.
to assist any refugees). The 1951 Convention guaran-
teed a refugee's right to make an asylum claim, but did
not guarantee a refugee's right to receive asylum. It
...defined a refugee as someone outside his country...,
unprotected by his own government and having a
well-founded fear of persecution on political, reli-
gious or racial grounds should he return. A person
fitting this definition had legal protection against
refoulement [involuntary repatriation]. 1
The High Commissioner lobbied for the expansion of
UNHCR's work beyond Europe, and the enlarged refu-
gee mandate was acknowledged in the Protocol of 31
January 1967.
General Regional Responses
Before the 1980s, extensive migration had existed
between Central American countries, but had been
mostly temporary. An analysis of why refugee move-
ments have become so rampant in Central America over
the last decade is beyond the scope of this article; suffice
it to say that each country's refugees share similar and
dissimilar reasons for migrating within or outside of the
region-reasons which include civil wars, state-spon-
sored terrorism, insurgent-sponsored terrorism, human
rights abuses, economic chaos, and environmental deg-
radation.
Though the flights of Central American refugees are
based on similar circumstances, the treatment of the
refugees depends on from where and to where they are
fleeing. The UNHCR has not succeeded in depoliti-
cizing refugee services in the region; therefore, the
myriads of other national and non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) responding to refugee needs have
been vital to refugee survival.
Honduras is the only country bordering all three civil
war zones-El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua-
and refugee policies there have become extremely po-
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liticized. Salvadoran, Honduran and U.S. officials in the
1980s continuously asserted that Salvadoran refugee
camps in Honduras were being used as guerilla staging
grounds. This official attitude encouraged local Hondu-
ran hostility to the refugees as well as hostility-to the
point of rape, beatings, and murders-among Honduran
soldiers "guarding" the refugee camps. 2 UNHCR was
not permitted to investigate any such attacks.
Honduras considered the refugees a temporary prob-
lem from the start, and never desired any solution short
of repatriation. In addition to a historic distrust of
Salvadorans, Honduras has shown resentment at having
international agencies operating within its borders.3
Because the Nicaraguan refugees of the 1980s were at
the other end of the political/refugee spectrum, they
were not considered an internal security threat andwere
thus allowed free movement and employment in Hon-
duras. Ironically enough, the Nicaraguan refugees caused
the displacement of some 100,000 Hondurans, but con-
tinued to receive preferential refugee treatment over
the Salvadoran refugees.4 TheUNHCR has struggled to
keep Nicaraguan refugees away from the Honduras/
Nicaragua border, whereas "the U.S...financed camps
right on the border for the explicit purpose of aiding the
contras."5
Mexico currently "hosts" more refugees from Central
America than any other regional actor (besides the
U.S.). Like Honduras, she dislikes having large concen-
trations of refugees along her border, although Mexico
has more legitimate security concerns since Guatema-
lan military forces have raided and bombed refugee
camps across the Mexican border.6 Mexico also fears
that the presence of Guatemalan refugees among kindred
Mexican Indians might elicit internal support for the
Guatemalan guerrillas.7
The UNHCR must channel aid through a Mexican
agency called COMAR, and can only assist refugees
officially designated by COMAR. The vast majority of
refugees in Mexico are not recognized by the Mexican
government. None of the Salvadorans are recognized at
all. Mexico has at times deported large numbers of
Central American refugees, despite protests by the
UNHCR, COMAR, and others. Because of the lack of
recognition for most refugees in Mexico, few have been
allowed to work.
Mexico, like Honduras, considered repatriation the
best solution, and, barring that, decided to move the
refugees away from the Guatemalan border. Most re-
fused to relocate: some fled the camps for other parts of
Mexico, and a few returned to Guatemala. Mexican
officials have taken extraordinary measures to coerce
relocation, including cutting offcamp supplies, burning
camps, interrogating and beating refugees, and detain-
ing and interrogating Catholic workers.8 Press and human
rights officials were barred access during the deporta-
tion periods, and UNHCR itselfwas barred camp access
for eleven days. Mexico has recently begun demonstrat-
ing more concern over the human rights abuses faced by
the Guatemalans, and since 1988 has ceased pressuring
for repatriation.
Nicaragua under the Sandinista government received
many refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala, as well
as providing a safe haven to many of the UNHCR's most
"difficult-to-place" refugees.9 Nicaragua offered incen-
tives to employers of refugees, and encouraged Salva-
doran-run agrarian cooperatives. It is unclear which
refugees will wish to or be allowed to continue seeking
asylum in Nicaragua under the unstable presidency of
Violeta Chamorro, or ifany such refugee programs have
been continued, particularly since Nicaragua is in the
process of receiving many returnees.
In the region, Costa Rica is the final significant host
of Central American refugees. Though also holding
partisan views of the regional conflicts, Costa Rica's
refugee reception in the 1980s was markedly more
humanitarian and less discriminatory than the recep-
tion offered by the other host countries, and is thus
worth a closer look.
Refugees in Costa Rica
Of all the regional refugee hosts, Costa Rica has
perhaps made the greatest effort to depoliticize assis-
tance to Central American refugees. Though not im-
mune from national ideologies and security concerns,
Costa Rica has offered a relatively more tranquil haven
for regional refugees.
Costa Rica is a tiny country (51,000 square kilome-
ters) with a population that only reached 3 million in
July 1990. The population changes from 1973-1984 in
Costa Rica were extraordinary: whereas the total popu-
lation of Costa Rica rose 29.1%, the Central American
alien population of Costa Rica rose 86%. By April 30,
1990, there were 48,565 officially registered refugees in
Costa Rica (mostly Central American), and estimates of
150,000 to 200,000 undocumented refugees.
The presidency of Oscar Arias (1986-1990) was marked
by heroic diplomatic efforts to settle the regional con-
flicts, culminating in the Arias Peace Plan of 198710 .
Costa Rica and Nicaragua subsequently signed the
Agreement on Voluntary Repatriation to begin mutual
assistance to the Nicaraguans in Costa Rican territory
who wished to return to Nicaragua, an agreement that
did not see much success until 1990.
In Costa Rica, national refugee policy is coordinated
byDIGEPARE-the General Directorate for Refugees.
The General Directorate oversees the refugee-related
activities of the Health Ministry, the Education Minis-
try, UNHCR, embassies, NGOs, etc., and evaluates and
approves all refugee projects in Costa Rica.
As ofMay 1990, there were six refugee camps in Costa
Rica, administered by a variety of organizations. Refu-
gees crossing the Nicaraguan border into Costa Rica are
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normally picked up by the Civil Guard and taken to one
of the two reception camps run by the International Red
Cross. Refugees receive assistance in education, nutri-
tion, and health. Children up to the age of 16 attend
school in the camps; UNHCR pays for supplies and
teacher salaries for the camp schools, which are run by
the Costa Rican Ministry ofPublic Education. Theoreti-
cally, refugees remain in Costa Rican reception camps
only one month (though in practice it often runs as high
as 6 months), and can then be transferred to Tilardn-a
camp run by the International Rescue Committee (IRC)-
-for a six-month transitory sojourn to get their legal
status processed. Costa Rican immigration officials
interview the refugees to see if they are eligible for
official refugee status under the 195 1 Convention or the
1967 Protocol. 11
After Tilar^n, refugees may move to IRC-run Achote
to receive physical and educational preparation for work
opportunities (agricultural and handicrafts, mostly).
Refugees in Achote continue to receive housing, water,
health care, etc., and general counseling on how to
integrate. IRC looks for businessmen or land owners
willing to hire refugee employees and willing to pay for
their Social Security tax. Thosewho stay in the camps are
free to work—mostly on nearby coffee, sugar cane, and
other farms; however, they cannot work until they have
general work authorization cards, as well as permission
from the Labor Ministry and the Social Security Minis-
try for the specific job requested. In theory, the culmina-
tion ofcamp life is supposed to be integration into Costa
Rican society via cooperatives, associations, etc. For
instance, several former Salvadoran camp-dwellers formed
a permanent cooperative settlement in Guanacaste that
has thrived for several years.
In reality, most refugees entering Costa Rica never
even go through the camp process; although most of
them remain undocumented refugees, some eventually
do go to the Immigration Department to apply for
asylum. Getting refugee status is a slow process in Costa
Rica and can take up to eight months. Temporary status
must be renewed every three months, but entitles the
refugees to a health examination and free health care
from the Costa Rican government, as well as free assis-
tance from the UNHCR.
Applying for work authorization is a separate and
equally lengthy process. Refugees used to be permitted
only to work in jobs that did not displace Costa Rican
workers. However, in January 1990, the Costa Rican
judiciary announced that refugees meeting any one of
the following conditions would be eligible for any type of
work: had been in Costa Rica over three years, were
married to a Costa Rican, or had a child born there.
UNHCR is not in direct control of refugee policies
and programs in Costa Rica but does provide technical
and financial support, as well as serve as liaison for the
variety of refugee service-providers in Costa Rica.
The Costa Rican Ministry ofPublic Education runs schools in the refugee camp.
UNHCR's total 1989 budget in Costa Rica was $6,072,000,
augmented by $425,000 worth of food donations from
the U.N. World Food Programme and miscellaneous
assistance from the UNDP.
In 1989, non-UNHCR contributions to refugee work
in Costa Rica included the following: housing funding
from Sweden; food from Japan, the European Eco-
nomic Community, and the Christian Association for
Relief Everywhere; medical supplies from Catholic Relief
Services; and hundreds ofprojects and programs funded
and/or run by a large assortment of Costa Rican and
foreign NGOs, as well as other foreign governments.
Costa Rica's refugee policies overall can be considered
fairly effective, humanitarian, and beneficial—remark-
able attributes given the recent volatility of the region.
Despite the breadth of refugee services available in
Costa Rica, the most satisfactory refugee service avail-
able in most instances is voluntary repatriation to the
refugee's country of origin at a time when it is safe and
fruitful to do so. After the defeat of the Sandinista
government in Nicaragua, it was generally assumed that
armed civil conflict there would end. Since Nicaraguans
were by far the largest refugee population in Costa Rica,
UNHCR began gearing up for massive repatriation.
Prior to June 1990, fewer than 100 Nicaraguans per
month were voluntarily repatriating: as of May 1990,
2,600 Nicaraguans had asked to repatriate.
Nevertheless, the situation in Nicaragua did not change
enough politically or economically to motivate all of the
refugees to repatriate. Many refugee workers in Costa
Rica told me that Nicaraguans were still crossing the
border into Costa Rica, and that massive volunteer
repatriation was unlikely because too many uncertain-
ties remained.
Unfortunately for the Nicaraguans and other refu-
gees, Costa Rica's welcome mat is slowly being with-
drawn. In a nutshell, "When refugees first started com-
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ing, the government was very generous; after eight years,
(a) the resources are limited, and (b) the refugee num-
bers have increased." 12 Though receiving a substantial
amount of international assistance for her refugee
population, Costa Rica's own economy is stagnating
(for a variety of reasons), and she is under increasing
social pressure to repatriate refugees. The government
of Costa Rica has, nevertheless, been one of the region's
strongest advocates of continued UNHCR refugee-plan-
ning in the region.
International Refugee Agreements
Though national security concerns have dominated
regional responses to Central American refugee move-
ments, most of the region's governments have signed
onto or otherwise recognized at least a few of the U.N.
refugee agreements. Countries receiving refugees in the
region have adhered to the principle ofnonrefoulement,
though in practice there have been many problems:
access to the legalistic asylum-seeking process is diffi-
cult in all the countries; in Honduras, Salvadoran refu-
gees have been attacked and killed by Honduran soldiers
while crossing the border, approaching the Honduran
camps, and even in the camps; in Mexico, all refugees are
subject to expulsion at any time without cause.
Steps towards improving international refugee coor-
dination in the region have increased in recent years,
starting with the various refugee resolutions incorpo-
rated into the "Central American Peace Plan" of 1984
(Esquipulus I) enacted by the Contadora Group, and
the resolutions on refugee principles signed in the Cart-
agena Declaration of 1984.
In 1987, the Advisory Group on Possible Solutions to
Central American Refugee Problems began the process
of regional intergovernmental planning and coopera-
tion on refugee issues. In August 1987, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras signed
the "Arias Peace Plan" (Esquipulus II), further outlin-
ing regional goals for refugee assistance. In 1988, the
U.N. responded to the peace initiative by approving a
Special Plan of Economic Cooperation (PEC) for Cen-
tral America. PEC's goals were to use development
programs to link social and economic policies with the
long-term Central American peace process.
An important component of PEC receiving early
implementation was PRODERE-the Development Pro-
gram for Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Returnees in
Central America. Drafted in late 1988, PRODERE has
used grassroots projects to promote sustainable devel-
opment in Central America. Projects have included
food aid, community organization, health and sanita-
tion provisions, promotion of economic activity, infra-
structure improvements, and legal aid. It is coordinated
by the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), and in-
cludes program assistance from UNHCR, the Interna-
tional Labor Organization, and the World Health Or-
ganization.
In May 1989, Guatemala hosted the first Interna-
tional Conference on Central American Refugees
(CIREFCA), which brought together representatives
from UNHCR, UNDP, the principal NGOs, and the
principally affected countries. CIREFCA delegates
reaffirmed previous resolutions on Central American
refugee issues, as well as recommending the following:
development of a North American convention on human
rights; recognition of the role ofNGOs in refugee assis-
tance; assistance to refugee host nations; and support of
the Arias Peace Plan.
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Be-
lize, Guatemala, and Mexico all submitted toCIREFCA
specific project requests for relief and development for
refugee populations. This commitment of all of the
region's governments to cooperate with each other and
the U.N. in development-oriented refugee projects was
an admission that no one was expecting peace to break
out anytime soon in Central America, as well as a
recognition that such an unlikely peace would not, in any
case, bring about an immediate reversal of refugee flows
or provide for smooth refugee returns.
CIREFCA was conceived as a bridge to link emer-
gency-oriented refugee activities to longer-term devel-
opment initiatives. CIREFCA accomplished several
important things:
• all the host countries seriously evaluated their refu-
gee problems;
- the historic tendency to subj ugate humanitarian refu-
gee issues to national security was diminished;
• host countries made firm refugee policy commit-
ments;
• service-providers developed more coordination of
resources and services;
• dialogue among NGOs, the U.N., and host countries
improved;
• host countries agreed that solutions for the displaced
needed to be long-term because the refugees had
become a major structural problem; and
• UNDP linked CIREFCA to portions of itsPEC man-
date, thereby establishing strong ties between UNDP
and UNHCR in the region for the first time. 13
With technical assistance from CIREFCA headquar-
ters in Costa Rica, CIREFCA delegates produced solid
documentation on their refugee plans for health, educa-
tion, agricultural production, and basic community in-
frastructure. CIREFCA projects were not expected to
reach all of the 2 million-plus refugees in the region, but
they were expected to address the most urgent refugee
needs. Though internal strife persists in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua, regional cooperation has
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definitely brought new hope for organized humanitar-
ian assistance to Central American refugees and af-
fected communities.
Refugees in Costa Rica since CIREFCA
Costa Rica has always been an active participant in
the long-term CIREFCA process. As UNHCR official
Jose" Riera pointed out to me in May 1990, Costa Rica
probably administered some S35 million in interna-
tional refugee aid between 1981 and 1989: "If this had
been in job-creation instead of maintenance, imagine
the economic development." 14 Though hoping for sig-
nificant refugee (especially Nicaraguan) repatriation,
Costa Rica recognized the potential benefits of pro-
ceeding with CIREFCA.
Costa Rica's request for CIREFCA funding in May
19S9 was S80 million. Some of the first CIREFCA
projects implemented in Costa Rica included: a low-
income housing project, paid for by Sweden; the closing
of the Alvaperal camp, paid for by Spain; and the closing
down of the Lim6n refugee camp by giving all the
residents the means to integrate into the community
(housing materials, small business loans, etc.), paid for
by the PRODERE fund.
PRODERE continued to fund refugee projects in
1990, with plans for "integrated rural development in
different communities," targeting some 300 refugee
families and 300 low-income Costa Rican families. 15 In
addition, Costa Rica requested more international fund-
ing at the June 1990 CIREFCA meeting. Costa Rica's
General Directorate for Refugees drafted a total of nine
project and program requests, divided into three catego-
ries: institutional, economic, and social.
The first institutional project was to be a National
Census of Undocumented Aliens. Official documents
would be provided to the undocumented, and Costa
Rica would study the possibility ofallowing them access
to basic Costa Rican local governmental services. This
documentation would also serve as work authorization.
Related to the census would bea "Migratory Regulation
and Legalization of Refugees and Undocumented Ali-
ens": six regional migration centers would be constructed
and staffed to provide reception, regulate migration,
and administer repatriation. The final institutional pro-
gram would be a "Reinforcement of the Ministry of
Labour for the Labour Insertion of Refugees and Un-
documented Aliens.. .into the Costa Rican job market".
Coordinated analysis of refugees and employment op-
portunities would result in the establishment of a na-
tional employment bureau to benefit both refugees and
Costa Ricans looking for work.
Costa Rica submitted four social projects for CI-
REFCA funding in June 1990. The first was "Strength-
ening of National Health Services for Refugees and
Undocumented Aliens." This was to be a 3-year project
to expand infrastructure and programs in the sectors of
primary health care, occupational safety and health,
sanitation, nutrition, etc., in areas highly populated by
refugees. Second was "Educational Infrastructure Needs
to Benefit Refugees, Undocumented Aliens and Na-
tionals"-also a 3-year project targeted for the areas
heavily inhabited by refugees. The projectwould involve
repairing 40 old classrooms; constructing 47 new class-
rooms, 49 new bathrooms, and 60 faculty houses; fur-
nishing 2,500 desks; and providing miscellaneous edu-
cational supplies. The third social program submitted
was for "Housing Credit for Refugees and Nationals
The commitment of all of the region's
governments to cooperated with each other
and the U.N. in development-oriented refugee
projects was an admission that no one was
expectingpeace to break out anytime soon
in Central America...
Participating in Mixed Productive Projects." The goals
were to provide credit to refugees for the purchase of550
homes—with an emphasis on self-construction efforts—
at an average cost per unit of $3,000. Housing credits
were expected to assist 100 Costa Rican families and 400
refugee families. The project would (in theory) allow
future repatriates to transfer their units to "another
refugee family or to a Costa Rican family of similar
socio-economic standing" and, in effect, the repatriates
could negotiate getting their loan bought out. Finally, a
social program was submitted for "Child Care for Refu-
gee, Undocumented, and Costa Rican Mothers." The
plan included construction of four new daycare centers
and the expansion and/or repair of 13 others in the
Lim6n and San Jose areas. It was intended to benefit 640
children. Daycare centers are still uncommon in Costa
Rica, and expansion of child care options is crucial,
particularly in light of Costa Rica's trend towards fe-
male-headed households.
The two broad economic projects submitted for fund-
ing were "Training and Credit for Refugees in Costa
Rica and/or Returnees in Nicaragua," and "Support for
Productive and Communal Activities to Attain Self-
SufficiencyAmong the Nicaraguan Refugee Population
Remaining in Costa Rica." In the first,
Those who opt for voluntary repatriation will receive
job training, in coordination with Nicaragua.. ..For
those who remain in Costa Rica, training will be
provided in the context of the Costa Rican employ-
ment market and will facilitate access to credit for the
consolidation of small business and/or family-run
enterprises. The cost of training is estimated to be
US$900 per capita;. ..credit has been established at a
level of US$1,220 per beneficiary.
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Refugees wait in line at the Office ofMigration ofRefugees in San Jose.
The training and credit project was intended to help
6,590 refugees (1,318 heads of households). This project
is to be run by ACIAR, a NGO which already has
substantial relevant experience. Regarding the second
Economic program,
The goals of this project, which will last 3 years, are
the following: economic self-sufficiency for at least 80
families through their incorporation into productive
agricultural projects; incorporation ofsome 90 heads
of households into permanent salaried positions with
agricultural businesses and industries; establishment
ofsmall family production and service businesses and
shops for 40 families with semiskilled labor who
require a little assistance to attain self-sufficiency;
integration of 90 heads of households as partners in
solvent existing small businesses and productive or-
ganizations; and guaranteed access to basic commu-
nity public services (health, education, water, elec-
tricity, etc.).
The expected beneficiaries would be 300 rural refu-
gee and Costa Rican families "of limited means." This is
obviously an ambitious project, but similar (albeit smaller-
scale) projects have already been successfully imple-
mented in Costa Rica. 16
Despite continued CIREFCA planning in 1990 and
1991, Costa Rica has maintained voluntary repatriation
as her refugee policy of greatest importance; unfortu-
nately, the disappointing numbers of voluntary repatri-
ates has finally led Costa Rica to consider deportation.
In July 1990, Costa Rica initiated a 12-month period in
which undocumented refugees were asked to file for
residential permits, student permits, or other appropri-
ate documentation. Rosa Eugenia Castro of the Gen-
eral Directorate for Refugees told me on April 1, 1991,
that if the undocumented did not apply for status by July
1991, they would be deported.
Evidently, there are still many refugees afraid to come
forward to attempt registration in Costa Rica. On Feb-
ruary 2, 1991, the Raleigh News and Observer reported
that Costa Rica was planning to deport 75,000 illegal
aliens, and Luis Guardia of the Costa Rican embassy in
Washington confirmed on February 22, 1991, that 70,000
deportations were planned. As the end of 1991 ap-
proached, this number of deportations had still not been
reached, and the future of illegal aliens in Costa Rica
remains uncertain.
Costa Rica appears to be at an important crossroads
in refugee policy. In many ways, Costa Rica has led the
way in careful and humanitarian planning for Central
American refugees, as well as cooperation with the U.N.
She is evidently worn out economically, however, un-
able to obtain international donations sufficient to cover
the economic and social costs of trying to sustain, let
alone integrate, the huge numbers of refugees inside her
borders. Costa Rica is also led by a new president with
less interest in regional diplomacy and cooperation than
in national economic development.
Conclusions about Refugee Planning
The international community can learn many lessons
from Costa Rica's first decade of massive refugee recep-
tion. One of the most important lessons is that refugee
needs cannot easily be separated from the needs of the
rest of the country; even refugees in camps will have an
effect on local roads, water use, food consumption,
employment patterns, and so forth. Refugees free to
move and work where they like will have an even bigger
impact-an impact that can be beneficial, or at least
neutral, ifwell-planned and aided by outside funding. A
humanitarian response to refugees also appears to have
some ameliorative effect on regional peacemaking ef-
forts. Finally, the international community should not
take advantage of a host country's generosity by denying
her adequate financial aid and planning assistance for
her refugee services, nor by refusing to accept a fair share
of refugees for resettlement.
Once one looks past the political complexities, refu-
gee services require the basic elements of development
planning. Thus, the first task of refugee service provid-
ers is to minimize the political constraints on their job-
-either by indirect lobbying, international concessions,
or separation ofcontroversial issues from main resettle-
ment projects. Once political obstacles are neutralized
(or minimized), refugee planning should be integrated
into comprehensive development programs.
In a broader sense, the Central American refugee
crisis has dramatized the need to reassess the response
to refugees throughout the world. Although host gov-
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ernments are reluctant to see international assistance go
to refugees rather than citizens, development-oriented
assistance can prove beneficial to both the refugees as
well as the surrounding communities. Writing for the
Population Council, Charles Keely has taken this ap-
proach to a more radical level:
...refugees are a product of underdevelopment. Since
over 95 percent of the world's refugees are in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America, one should question whether
a strategy emphasizing camps and third-country re-
settlement that developed in a European context is
becoming increasingly unable to cope with current
realities....resources should be channeled to asylum
countries to make refugees self-sustaining, and there
should be development aid for indigenous popula-
tions in theareas of host countrieswhere refugees are
given asylum. 17
Resettlement workers should forego the assumption
that refugees are only temporary residents, and make
medium- or long-term plans on their behalf. Even if they
were to repatriate, the process would be slow, and thus
allow for a gradual phase-out of any programs, or a
transformation of successful programs from refugee-
orientation to citizen-orientation (i.e., small-scale en-
terprises could be sold or given to local citizens, housing
could be transferred, etc.). Resettlement workers should,
if financial resources permit, give refugees access to the
full range of social services necessary to mainstream
them-housing,job referrals, transportation, education,
etc. This is a productive use of relief funds that should
serve to enable refugees to become participatory and
contributory members of society, if only temporarily.
Integration depends on local economies as well as
political attitudes towards the refugees. Planners must
learn to view refugees as residents with special needs-
not as foreigners with separate needs-and plan compre-
hensive policies encompassing them. Planners should
also involve the refugees in the planning process.
Obstacles to successful policies for refugee-planning
remain. First of all, there is always concern that treating
refugees too weli will encourage further migration. Though
this possibility cannot be entirely denied, one must not
forget that the original wave ofmigration was not caused
by expectations of a cushy life somewhere else, but
rather from a desperate need to escape an unlivable
situation in the country of origin. Few people depart
their homelands without serious emotional trauma and,
while rumors of great treatment on the other side of the
border may be a decisive factor in deciding to leave, such
expectations would never be the initial factor motivat-
ing the migrants to go. In addition, development-ori-
ented refugee planning is a slow process and could not
even begin logistically before analysts have had enough
time to assess whether or not there is a good chance that
the refugees will be able to return to their homelands
"soon." However, in situations where development-
oriented or integration-oriented refugee planning is
economically or politically unacceptable, the host coun-
try should consider lobbying for resettlement to a third
country rather than leaving the refugees to languish
indefinitely in camps.
Ultimately, no matter how many international agree-
ments are signed, independent states will not yield sov-
ereigntywhen it comes to immigration. Even ifa country
is bound by treaty not to deport someone to the country
from which he/she fled, the country might still force the
refugee to go to a third country. Even the most rational
and depoliticized planners cannot escape the political
baggage attached to refugee planning. Understanding of
the issues involved is the key to doing as much as
possible for these people who have suffered so much.
[Editor's note: This research coincided with the inaugura-
tion ofa new Costa Ricanpresident, andalso came shortly
after the inauguration ofa new Nicaraguan president, and
therefore pertained to refugee policies that would soon
thereafter undergo significant change.]
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Historically, liberals and conservatives have disagreed
over the causes ofpoverty. Recently, however, their
attitudes toward existing public programs to assist the
poor have converged. Liberals and conservatives alike
have criticized these programs for failing to move people
out of poverty. More specifically, public housing and
other programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) have been faulted for having built-in
incentives that discourage recipients from increasing
their incomes. The lack of coordination among the
various social assistance programs has also been criti-
cized. A person may receive job training, for example,
but have to drop out because child care is unavailable.
Overall, the current array of housing and social services
has not effectively assisted poor families in attaining
self-sufficiency.
An important goal of housing and social programs
should be to help individuals and families achieve self-
sufficiency. This notion is reflected in recent housing
and social service legislation, including the Family Support
Act of 1988 and the National Affordable Housing Act of
1990. These acts seek to restructure housing and social
services to provide incentives and support for self-suffi-
ciency, rather than simply maintaining recipients at a
minimum standard of living.
The Need for Self-Sufficiency Programs
There are approximately 33.6 million people living
below the poverty level in the United States. This repre-
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sents about 13.5 percent of the total population. Al-
though this rate is lower than the 1983 poverty rate of
15.2 percent, it remains substantially higher than the
11.4 percent rate recorded in 1978. 1 If transfer pay-
ments such as welfare and food stamps are subtracted
from income, however, the poverty rate has showed re-
markable stability throughout the seventies and eight-
ies. The poverty rate was 21.3 percent in 1965, 19
percent in 1973, and 22.9 percent in 1984.2 Thus, fed-
eral income maintenance programs have reduced pov-
erty, but they do not seem to have reduced the need for
public assistance, the ideal goal for public programs.
The characteristics ofthose in poverty has also changed
over the last two decades. Over half of all poor families
are now headed by women, and female-headed house-
holds with children are six times more likely to be poor
than two-parent households. This suggests that the
child care responsibilities of single-parent households
can be a major obstacle to employment and self-suffi-
ciency.3 In addition, a combination of low wages, tem-
porary unemployment, limited work hours and large
families have kept many families from moving out of
poverty. Close to half of the 6.8 million family heads
who were poor in 1988 held jobs.
The poor today are also more likely to be concen-
trated in central cities. According to a report by the
National Research Council, "better educated and more
highly skilled residents, including minorities, are mov-
ing out of the central cities, leaving behind a concentra-
tion of disadvantaged residents isolated in poverty neigh-
borhoods. This group of persistently poor central-city
residents, called an 'underclass' by some, does not par-
ticipate in expanding economic opportunities."4 More-
over, there is a growing imbalance between the skills of
low-income people and the requirements ofcentral city
employers, which contributes to the high rates ofunem-
ployment and poverty in central cities.5
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Strategies for Helping the Poor
Clearly, there is no shortage of programs designed to
assist the poor. The total cost of government programs
specifically designed to aid the poor was estimated at
S 165.2 billion in 1987. The federal government paid
nearly three-fourths of this amount.6 An analysis done
by the Congressional Research Service, however, shows
that anti-poverty funds have been shifted away from
programs that offer a permanent solution to poverty.
From 1968 to 1988, anti-poverty expenditures shifted
from cash support and job training programs to the
direct provision of food and housing.
In spite of many anti-poverty programs, poverty per-
sists at unacceptably high levels. The structure of public
assistance programs and the lackofcoordination among
them arc partially to blame. A criticism of welfare pro-
grams has been that they undermine the incentives for
work and breed dependence on public subsidies. Until
recently, for example, AFDC and Medicaid were linked
so that if recipients earned enough to no longer qualify
for AFDC they also lost their Medicaid benefits. Since
most of these people held jobs that did not include
medical benefits, they either had to wager on staying
healthy or pay a large part of their salary for medical
coverage.
The fragmentation of service delivery has also se-
verely limited the effectiveness of anti-poverty pro-
grams. Poor families often have multiple impediments
to becoming self-sufficient. 7 These include lack of basic
skills, lack of transportation options, poor housing quality,
poor health and sometimes substance abuse problems.
There is therefore a need for a coordinated package of
services to achieve self-sufficiency. Federal and state
governments finance more than seventy programs de-
signed specifically for individuals with limited incomes.
Additional programs are offered by local religious, phil-
anthropic and other private organizations. These pro-
grams have different eligibility requirements, are ad-
ministered by different agencies and require different
application procedures. As a result, it becomes very
difficult for the poor to obtain all the services needed to
become self-sufficient.
Families receiving AFDC payments, for example,
may still live in dilapidated or overcrowded housing or
may not have the basic skills to find employment. In a
recent study by Newman and Schnare, 30 percent of the
3.5 million families receiving AFDC were found to have
multiple housing problems such as poor housing condi-
tions and high housingcosts. Afull 83 percent had a high
rent burden and 25 percent lived in substandard hous-
ing.
8 Moreover, limited housing choices frequently af-
fect a family's ability to attain self-sufficiency by curtail-
ing mobility and obstructing the pursuit of new jobs,
education and improved social conditions. Housing
conditions also affect the physical and mental health of
individuals, and can indirectly influence an individual's
job performance.
The Logic of Self-Sufficiency Programs
Self-sufficiency programs are designed to reduce the
incentives to remain in public welfare programs. They
provide poor, unemployed and under-employed house-
holds with a coordinated package ofservices designed to
enable them to become self-sufficient. Individuals in
poor families often need remedial education and job
training to become self-sufficient. They may also need
other support services. For example, they may need
counselling to help develop a set of personal goals or
child care that allows them to participate in training and
employment activities. They may also need transporta-
tion assistance and decent housing.
Coordination of services is typically facilitated by
boards or advisory committees composed ofrepresenta-
tives from the area social service agencies, including the
department of social services, the housing authority,
employment and training department, and other public
and non-profit service providers. These boards facilitate
the delivery of a coordinated package of services and
oversee the progress of the programs.
Self-sufficiency programs typically rely on case man-
agers to assess the full range of services that participants
need. Case managers help participants apply for services
and act as advocates for them as they deal with various
service agencies. Case managers also provide coun-
selling and general encouragement throughout the train-
ing period and may follow-up after they have obtained a
job. In some instances, the assessment of client needs
result in the realization that new services are needed in
a community, or that existingservices must be expanded.
Experience with Self-Sufficiency Programs
The Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) has been a leader in sponsoring self-
sufficiency programs. In 1984, HUD introduced Project
Self-Sufficiency (PSS) as one of its Quality of Life Initia-
tives. This demonstration project provided an addi-
tional allocation of Section 8 certificates to communi-
ties that were willing to draw on both public and private
sector resources to develop a comprehensive and coor-
dinated program of job training, remedial education,
child care, transportation and other services designed to
break the cycle of poverty. HUD also provided technical
assistance to the participating communities, but com-
munities were expected to rely on other sources to pay
for additional services.
In all, 155 communities participated in PSS. HUD
provided the participants with approximately 10,000
Section 8 certificates, totaling nearly S48 million in
contract authority.9 An evaluation of the PSS demon-
stration was encouraging. Of the more than 9,928 single
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parentswho entered the program, 42 percent completed
it and either obtained full-time jobs with growth poten-
tial or enrolled in college degree programs. 10
The Bush administration replaced Project Self-Suffi-
ciency with Operation Bootstrap, which is virtually iden-
tical to its predecessor. On October 4, 1989, Jack Kemp,
Secretary ofHousing and Urban Development announced
S85.8 million in awards to 61 housing authorities to
implement Operation Bootstrap. This represents a total
of 2,842 Section 8 certificates. Although HUD has
commissioned an evaluation of this program, the results
are not available at this time.
The Gonzales Affordable Housing Act, passed in late
1990, also creates several new self-sufficiency programs.
Title V, Section 554 of that act authorizes the Family
Self-Sufficiency (FSS) program. FSS is similar to PSS
and Operation Bootstrap in that it seeks to promote
In spite of many anti-poverty programs, poverty
persists at unacceptable high levels. The structure
ofpublic assistanceprograms and the lack of
coordination among them are partially to blame.
self-sufficiency by providing those receiving housing
subsidies with a comprehensive, coordinated package of
social services. These services include family counselling,
transportation assistance, day care, literacy and job train-
ing. Like earlier programs, it calls for the creation of a
coordinating body composed of representatives from
the public housing authority (PHA) and other local
public and private social service agencies. It also calls for
the development of an action plan to coordinate these
services; however, no new funds are provided to pay for
them.
The FSS program is different from the earlier pro-
grams in several ways, however. Earlier programs were
voluntary, whereas this program is mandatory for fiscal
year 1993 and beyond. Specifically, local housing au-
thorities must have self-sufficiency programs that ac-
commodate the number of participants equal to the
number ofnew assisted housing units provided byHUD.
For example, if in 1993 HUD provides a city with fifty
vouchers and fifty public housing units, they will have to
accommodate 100 participant's in a self-sufficiency pro-
gram. Housing authorities that lack support for local
services or administrative costs can be exempted from
the program, however.
The second major difference is that participating
families who receive Section 8 certificates or vouchers
can lose their housing assistance if they do not follow
through with the program. This provision does not apply
to public housing residents, however. Each participant
must sign a contract with the sponsoring housing au-
thority that includes the support services provided to the
family and the responsibilities of the program partici-
pants. These responsibilities include taking part in job
training programs, seeking employment, and other ac-
tivities that lead to self-sufficiency. Furthermore, each
participating family must fulfill its obligation under the
contract within five years. At the end of five years, or if
the family cannot meet the responsibilities specified in
the contract, the family loses its housing voucher or
certificate. Extensions beyond five years can be granted
for good cause.
A third difference is that the FSS program has an
escrow account provision. This provision requires hous-
ing authorities to set up escrow accounts for participants
with incomes below 80 percent of the area median.
When a family enters the program, the base rent is set at
30 percent of its income. As income increases, the
participant continues to pay 30 percent of household
income, but the difference between the base rent and the
new rent is put into an interest-bearing escrow account.
A participating family may withdraw the funds from this
account only after it no longer receives federal, state or
other public housing assistance.
The other major self-sufficiency program authorized
by the National Affordable Housing Act is the Public
Housing Family Investment Centers program (Title V,
Section 515). This is a competitive grant program that
provides housing authorities with funds to remodel
public housing developments or nearby buildings to
accommodate resident training and support service
programs. The grant funds can be used to pay for up to
15 percent of the cost of delivering these services and to
hire service coordinators. This program, unlike the FSS
program, provides at least limited funding for the serv-
ices. In addition, any income received in job training or
support service programs are not considered in calculat-
ing rent payments. Income earned in the first job follow-
ing participation in the program is also excluded from
rent calculation for an 18-month period. Unfortunately,
the recent Veterans Administration, HUD and Inde-
pendent Agencies Spending Bill did not fund this sec-
tion of the act.
The 1990 Housing Act also changed how all rents for
federally assisted housing are calculated. The act holds
rent increases to a maximum of 10 percent each year for
three years after a previously unemployed household
member finds employment. This is to increase the incen-
tive for unemployed assisted housing residents to find
employment.
Charlotte's Gateway Housing Program
The Gateway Housing Program in Charlotte, NC, is a
good example of a self-sufficiency program. It is one of
the first programs of its type in the nation and served as
a model for the FSS program.
The objective of the Gateway Housing program is to
help very low-income families become socially and
economically self-sufficient. The program was designed
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by local officials in Charlotte to enhance the labor
market skills of participants so that they can become
home owners and move out of public housing. This
emphasis on home ownership is meant to provide a clear
and desirable goal for program participants. Partici-
pants begin learning about qualifying for home owner-
ship and the process ofbuying a home soon after they are
accepted in the program.
The Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA) publicizes
the program through newsletters and presentations at
tenant council meetings. Families must earn less than
$12,500 a year to qualify for the program. There is a
separate program for families who earn more than $12,500
per year. Applicants go through a screening process that
involves an initial interview with program staff, a read-
ing and occupational preference test, and checks for
criminal convictions, rent and credit history.
If a family is accepted, they enter into a mutually
binding contract with the CHA. This contract specifies
the services the housing authority and other city agen-
cies will provide. These services can include remedial
education, treatment for substance abuse, family and
peer counseling, daycare and job training. The contract,
which is in the form ofan addendum to the family's lease,
also permits the CHA to terminate the lease ifthe family
does not meet its responsibilities.
The program has a remedial stage and a transition
stage. The remedial stage begins with a series ofdiagnos-
tics designed to identify a participant's educational and
vocational deficiencies. These tests, which are carried
out by CHA staffand the city's Employment and Train-
ing Department, are used to identify individual barriers
to self-sufficiency and to prepare a plan for overcoming
them. This plan typically involves remedial education,
day care assistance and job training. Education and job
training are provided in many fields, including medical
services, computer operations and automotive repair.
A participant must complete the remedial phase of
the Gateway program in two years. CHA does not accept
individuals it feels will need more than two years of
remedial services. During the two-year period, a partici-
pant's maximum rent is frozen at the level he or she was
paid when entering the program. Moreover, other needs-
based benefits such as AFDC or Food Stamps remain
constant, even though family income might improve.
This provision was authorized by a special section of the
Housing Act of 1987. It also required approval by the
state and county divisions of social services. These pro-
visions are designed to eliminate the disincentives asso-
ciated with higher incomes and permit participants to
accumulate sufficient income to stabilize their financial
situation.
The transition stage is designed to further strengthen
participants' employment skills and increase their in-
comes. Participants will also receive home ownership
counseling, financial budgeting training, and other serv-
ices to help them make the transition from public hous-
ing to home ownership. Participants can remain in the
transitional stage of the program for up to five years but
many are expected to graduate into their own homes
within a shorter time period.
During the transition phase, a family in the Gateway
Program spends 30 percent of its income for rent. CHA
deposits the difference between actual rent payments
and the operating expenses of the unit and complex in
which the family lives into an escrow account that can be
used to make a down payment on a house. As family
income increases, so does its rent, but the rent increment
accrues to the family's escrow account rather than to the
housing authority.
At the completion ofthe transition phase,CHA helps
the family find suitable housing on the private market.
The accumulated savings from excess rent payments, in
One ofthe extraordinary aspects of the Gateway
housingprogram is the commitment that Char-
lotte's social service organizations have demon-
strated to the program... It remains to be seen
whether social service providers in other cities
can cooperate as well as those in Charlotte.
conjunction with mortgage assistance from the North
Carolina Housing Finance Agency and the Charlotte
Housing Partnership, assure the availability of afford-
able home ownership opportunities.
Gateway is managed by one full-time staff member,
who also acts as a case manager for program partici-
pants. The Office ofEmployment and Training provides
staff to do the occupational testing. The Department of
Social Services assigns additional case workers to each
of the Gateway participants receiving AFDC. Child
Care Resources, a local nonprofit organization, pro-
vides child care services.
Gateway's Effectiveness
As of October 1991, there were 85 participants in the
Gateway program. The average incomes of those who
had been in the program at least 18 months increased
from $6,607 to $7,607. The average education level
increased from 11.4 years to 12.2 years. The percentage
of participants with full-time jobs remained stable at 37
percent, but the number with part-time jobs increased
from 17 percent to 35 percent. Several families have
moved through the program more quickly than antici-
pated and are now in the process of buying homes.
At the same time, 24 families have either dropped out
or have been terminated from the program. The most
frequent reason for termination is they did not live up to
their agreements to participate in remedial activities.
Several participants were dropped from the program
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because ofdrug involvement or other criminal behavior.
It is difficult for the housing authority staff to find
public housing residents who are both interested in and
qualified for the program. Out of 553 applicants, only
160 qualified. This number includes the 85 current
participants, 41 applicants who were accepted but did
not want to participate in the program, and those that
graduated or withdrew from the program. The major
reason for rejecting applicants was that it would require
more than the two years of remedial education and
training for them to qualify for jobs that pay at least 57
per hour. Many applicants did not have high school
degrees and had very low reading levels.
Conclusions
It is too early to assess the full impacts of this program
on its participants. Although this new approach to
coordinating housing and social services is promising,
there are several issues that deserve discussion. First,
self-sufficiency programs are small and include a very
small percentage of those who need assistance. Last
year, HUD's Operation Bootstrap involved less than
3,000 families nationally. The Gateway program cur-
rently involves only 100 of the nearly 5,000 families in
Charlotte's public housing.
Although the new housing act seeks to greatly expand
these programs, expansion is limited by lack of funding
for support services and program staff. Self-sufficiency
programs provide very little new funding for carrying
out these programs, and existing staff and funds are
limited. Increased funding for these programs is neces-
sary if they are to serve more than a handful of the
families in need.
Self-sufficiency programs depend on cooperation
among local service providers. One of the extraordinary
aspects of the Gateway housing program is the commit-
ment that Charlotte's social service organizations have
demonstrated to the program. The Departments of Social
Services, Employment and Training, and other organi-
zations have altered theirstandard procedures and have
dedicated staffand other organizational resources to the
program. It remains to be seen whether social service
providers in other cities can cooperate as well as those in
Charlotte.A number of earlier attempts at coordinating
services have been undermined by competition and
conflict among local service providers.
The assumption behind self-sufficiency programs is
that residents of public and subsidized housing are
motivated to achieve self-sufficiency. The experience
with the Gateway Housing Program suggests that this
may not be the case for a large proportion of residents.
The housing authority has found it very difficult to find
100 residents that are both interested in and qualified
for the program. The program staff members suggest
that many residents of public housing have given up on
themselves. They lack the self-confidence and self-es-
teem to undertake educational and job training pro-
grams.
Given the limited funding for social services, concen-
trating services on families involved in self-sufficiency
programs means that other needy families will not be
served. Agencies can either distribute funds to all needy
communities or target funds to one area, although this
does not have to be an all or nothing decision. Some very
basic social services (such as food assistance) can be
offered to the widest group, while others (such as job
training and day care assistance) can be targeted to those
in self-sufficiency programs.
There is a compelling logic to concentrating services
on a smaller group if this will lead to self-sufficiency.
Rather than maintaining a state of poverty and depend-
ence, self-sufficiency programs have the potential to
move people out of poverty and off direct public assis-
tance. As program participants become self-sufficient,
others can take advantage of the coordinated services
offered by these programs.
Finally, although these programs appear to have great
potential, the history of attempts to assist the poor is
littered with programs that had great potential. Data on
the performance of self-sufficiency programs is still
scant. We need to follow the progress of these programs
carefully to assess their performance.
[Editor's note: The authors, with assistancefrom the Ford
Foundation, are in theprocess ofconductingan evaluation
of Charlotte's Gateway housing program. Over the next
severalyears, they will monitor the progress of the partici-
pants as they move through theprogram and will simulta-
neouslyfollow a control group ofresidents who are not in
theprogram. The authors hope that they can contribute to
the development and possible expansion of the self-suffi-
ciency programs.]
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Departmental News
Edward Bergman and Gunther
Maier (Vienna University of Eco-
nomics) completed a study of policy
outcomes for the North Carolina
Rural Economic Development
Center (education and training, roads,
entrepreneurs, capital investments,
urban and rural populations, retir-
ees, agriculture, government
employment.telecommunications,
etc.) that affected the economic de-
velopment of North Carolina coun-
ties between 1980 and 1987. The
main findings were prepared to run
on STORYBOARD, an IBM-sup-
ported presentation medium. Addi-
tional publications are being pre-
pared for release in professional and
academic journals.
Bergman spent twoweeks in June
and July of 1991 interviewing uni-
versity and public officials in Pra-
gue, Bratislava and Budapest to learn
about activities underway regarding
privatization of regional economies
and probable impacts on the natural
environment. The work was con-
ducted in conjunction with USAID
and Duke University's Center for
Tropical Conservation as background
to a proposal to investigate two trans-
border development options that
bridge Czechoslovakian and Austrian
regions.
Bergman organized the regional
science and development track of
the joint ACSP-AESOP conference
in Oxford, England in July. Fifty
papers and presentationswere given
by faculty from North American and
European planning schools.
Through the UNC Institute of Eco-
nomic Development, Bergman is
working with Rick Carlisle, (DCRP
alumnus) and Stuart Rosenfeld
(DCRP adjunct faculty), on a Ford
Foundation-supported project to de-
sign and propose a permanent cen-
ter in the U.S. South for policy re-
search. The center would organize
and focus a wide variety of planning
and policy researchers at universi-
ties and centers throughout the South
as a permanent think-tank to help
solve regional policy issues facing
state and local officials. A key fea-
ture is the design of a research proc-
ess that blends research scholarship
provided by university faculty and
the policy savvy of experienced pro-
fessionals. The center would also
cooperate with the Central Euro-
pean Regional Research Organiza-
tion (CERRO) on comparative policy
issues facing both parts of the world.
Raymond Burby, Edward Kaiser,
Dale Roenigk (DCRP Ph.D. Stu-
dent), Maureen Heraty (recent DCRP
graduate now working with Wash-
ington, DC COG), and Robert Pa-
terson (DCRP Ph.D. student) have
recently completed an evaluation of
local urban stormwater management
in North Carolina. The study fo-
cuses on the issue ofmaintenance of
stormwater control measures, and
features interviews with stormwater
managers in 88 North Carolina cit-
ies, field inspection of numerous
stormwater control structures in four
cities, and a Delphi survey ofa panel
of experts from North Carolina and
elsewhere. The report is available
through the Water Resources Re-
search Institute, NCSU, Box 7912,
1131 Nat. Res. Bldg., Raleigh, NC
27695-7912, (919) 737-2815. The au-
thors also hope to report the results
at the spring meetings of the North
Carolina chapter of the American
Planning Association.
Glenn Cassidy and Mike Luger
are currently in the second (and fi-
nal) year of a study financed by Urban
Mass Transit Administration on
"Busways, Subways, and Tramways..."
Cassidy and Luger are doing bene-
fit-cost analyses of busway systems
in Pittsburgh and Houston, and us-
ing the results to identify possible
cities in the Southeast in which
busways might be viable transit al-
ternatives.
Cassidy is also working on a study
of equity in education finance in North
Carolina school districts.
Cassidy and Luger have applied
to the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation for another grant, to study
transportation finance by state gov-
ernments and the shortfalls that may
arise from relying on gas taxes while
gas consumption is falling.
David Godschalk has been ap-
pointed to the North Carolina Leg-
islative Study Committee on State-
wide Comprehensive Planning by
Daniel Blue, Speaker of the North
Carolina House. The committee is
charged with exploring the poten-
tial for state growth management. It
is directed to consider the programs
and experiences of other states, in
order to develop a state-mandated
comprehensive planning program in
which plans are prepared by local
governments and coordinated at a
regional and state level. It will make
a final report to the 1993 General
Assembly.
Harvey Goldstein, Suk-Chan Ko
(a DCRP Ph.D. candidate) and
William F. Little (Professor of Chem-
istry and Interim Provost) are con-
ducting a study of the incidence of
technology-based business start-ups
and spin-offs in the Research Tri-
angle region. They are particularly
interested in the role of the area's
three research universities, as well
as other attributes of the regional
"milieu" in entrepreneurs' decisions
to start up or spin off companies in
the Triangle, in contrast to other
high-tech regions.
Emil Malizia is completing re-
search sponsored by the Econom-
mic Development Authority of the
U.S. Department of Commerce on
economic diversity and employment
stability. He is also Program Direc-
tor for the Center for Accessible
Housing at North Carolina State
University. The Center is a five-year
research and training program sup-
ported by the National Institute for
Disabilities and Rehabilitation
Research, U.S. Department of Edu-
cation. Malizia is co-author of Real
Estate Development, published in 1991
by the Urban Land Institute. Mal-
izia is directing UNC's Basic Eco-
nomic Development Course, being
held February 24-28, 1992 at the
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